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This dissertation consists of three essays that focus on the determinants and impli-
cations of exchange rate behavior in emerging markets. In particular, central bank
foreign exchange intervention and currency substitution are examined. The rst es-
say studies foreign exchange intervention conducted by the National Bank of Georgia.
Various econometric methodologies are applied to study both the determinants and
e¤ectiveness of intervention. A unique daily data set is employed in the analysis.
The major intervention motives of leaning-against-the-wind and of decreasing volatil-
ity are revealed. Intervention inuences the exchange rate as intended after a one-day
lag. However, this e¤ectiveness is achieved at the price of increased volatility of the
exchange rate. In the second and third essays, the issue of currency substitution is
studied. Two-currency monetary models are specied to analyze and explain currency
substitution from di¤erent perspectives. These models focus on economic observables
that inuence a households decision to switch to a foreign currency, namely the ex-
change rate, interest rates of savings in foreign and domestic currencies, and domes-
tic and foreign ination. The second essay studies the signicance and rationalizes
currency substitution in Georgia. The paper nds that this issue is of rst-order im-
portance in Georgia. The actual dynamics of currency substitution is well explained
by the model that accentuates the exchange rate. The third essay is a comparative
study of currency substitution in the Czech Republic, Georgia, Croatia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. Country-specic structural breaks are detected,
rationalized, and introduced in the estimation based on theoretical monetary models.
The main ndings suggest that currency substitution is signicant in Croatia, Georgia,





I would like to express my gratitude to Petr Zemµcík for his encouraging thesis super-
vision and excellent guidance. I am very grateful for valuable comments and helpful
suggestions (in alphabetic order) to Josef Brada, Kathryn Dominguez, Jan Hanousek,
Michal Kejak, Evzen Koµcenda, Ali Kutan, Sergey Slobodyan, and Jan Svejnar; partic-
ipants at the Society for the Study of Emerging Markets conference on challenges and
opportunities in emerging markets in July 2010 as well as research seminars partici-
pants at CERGE-EI; and three anonymous referees at the Emerging Markets Finance
and Trade journal. I am thankful to Archil Imnaishvili and Edward Oganesyan for
exclusive data provided. Thanks go to Richard Stock for editing the dissertation. And
last, but not least, I am very grateful to my husband, Jean-Camille Loiseau, and my
parents for their strong support. This dissertation research was partially supported by
Research Grant 259027 from the Grant Agency of Charles University. Research for the
second chapter of the dissertation was mainly conducted during a stay at the Gerald




This dissertation focuses on the connection between domestic and external eco-
nomic sectors in emerging markets. The link between foreign and domestic currency
holdings and the ability to inuence the exchange rate are studied. The rst two pa-
pers focus on Georgia, a country that has not received much attention in the academic
literature. Central bank foreign exchange intervention and currency substitution are
studied in these papers. The third essay compares the Georgian experience of currency
substitution to that of the Czech Republic, Croatia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan.
The rst chapter is motivated by frequent partially-sterilized interventions con-
ducted by the National Bank of Georgia. There is no consensus in the scanty academic
literature on the e¢ ciency of such interventions in emerging markets. This paper
presents new evidence on the determinants and the e¤ectiveness of intervention in
Georgia. Daily data covering more than eleven years is used for the analysis. To
account for the ongoing transformation process in Georgia, structural breaks in the
data are determined and explicitly introduced in the estimation. The results indicate
that the National Bank of Georgia leans against the wind and aims to decrease ex-
change rate volatility. In general, the Bank wants to limit the pace of the appreciation
of the local currency against the US dollar. Daily-frequency connection between the
intervention and the level as well as the volatility of exchange rate is revealed. The
immediate e¤ect of intervention on the exchange rate is opposite to the intention. The
intended e¤ect on the level of the exchange rate is observed already the next day after
the intervention is conducted. However, frequent interventions increase the conditional
volatility of the exchange rate in Georgia.
The second chapter studies the signicance of currency substitution (dollarization)
in Georgia and rationalizes its level. This work is motivated by the large and per-
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sistent holdings of US dollars in Georgia following its economic transformation. The
academic literature suggests that dollarization plays a role that is more signicant in
emerging markets than in developed economies. However, the evidence on dollariza-
tion is highly dependent on country specicities, the time period, and the implemented
methodology. In this paper, the money-in-utility-function framework with households
main motives for switching to a foreign currency is specied. The motives are changes
in the exchange rate, the interest rates of savings in foreign and domestic currencies,
and domestic and foreign ination. In addition, households update their preferences
according to accumulated knowledge on dollarization. This aims to capture all the pos-
sible factors that inuenced the dollarization process in the past. Both the elasticity of
currency substitution between domestic and foreign currencies, and the share of foreign
currency in total households money holdings are estimated using monthly Georgian
data. The results show that the demand for US dollars is responsive to uctuations
in fundamentals. The US dollar has a signicant 60 percent share in householdstotal
liquidity in Georgia. Moreover, the US dollar is a strong substitute for the domestic
currency in terms of reducing transaction costs. The demand for the dollar becomes
less responsive to uctuations in the exchange rate when news are introduced due to
learning adjustment. In order to rationalize the actual dollarization, models with dif-
ferent motives for dollar holdings are compared. This allows identifying the exchange
rate as the best predictor of dollarization in Georgia.
The third chapter examines householdscurrency substitution in several countries
based on the implications of money-in-utility-function models. A new data set is
compiled to estimate and compare the signicance of household dollarization in the
Czech Republic, Georgia, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey.
As monthly consumption series are not available for each country, householdsoptimal
choices between foreign and domestic money are derived in terms of observables and
parameters. Structural breaks that are exogenous from the perspective of the models
are detected, discussed, and added to the estimation. The results show that the share of
foreign currency in total domestic liquidity is positively signicant in all countries. The
share of foreign currency in total liquidity is economically small in the Czech Republic
(10-22 percent) and in Kazakhstan (15-48 percent). The highest share is in Croatia
(91-93 percent). Foreign currency accounts for more than half of the total domestic
liquidity in Georgia, Tajikistan, and Turkey. The economic signicance of currency
substitution decreases over time in Croatia, Georgia, and Turkey, and increases in
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Foreign currency is a strong substitute for
the local currency in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.
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Determinants and E¤ectiveness of Foreign
Exchange Market Intervention in Georgia
Abstract:
This paper uses unique daily data to study the determinants and the e¤ectiveness
of partially sterilized intervention by the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) during the
period 1996-2007. Detected structural breaks in the exchange rate and the intervention
series are important for NBG intervention motives and e¤ectiveness. The central bank
reaction functions indicate that the NBG leans against the wind while smoothing the
exchange rate. The intended e¤ect on the level of the exchange rate is observed the next
day after the intervention is conducted. However, the conditional volatility increases
with intervention.
Keywords: foreign exchange intervention, Georgia, structural break, determinants
of intervention, e¤ectiveness of intervention
JEL classication: C13, E44, E58, F31.
1.1 Introduction
Foreign exchange intervention is a commonly used tool of exchange rate man-
agement in advanced and developing economies. Intervention is mainly conducted by
central banks in order to inuence the exchange rate level and to "calm a disorderly
market". The recent evidence on advanced countries suggests that intervention typi-
cally has an impact on the level and volatility of the exchange rate (Sarno and Taylor,
2001, Fatum and King, 2005). The literature on the direction of intervention impact is
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less homogeneous but the majority of studies tends towards stating increased volatility
(Dominguez, 2003, 2006; counter-examples include Fatum and King, 2005 and Kim,
2007). This evidence is primarily focused on the e¤ects of sterilized intervention.
Intervention in emerging market economies is not always fully and immediately
sterilized. Such intervention is argued to have a stronger impact on the exchange rate
than in advanced economies (Canales-Kriljenko, 2003).1 However, evidence on the in-
tervention e¤ectiveness for emerging market economies remains fairly mixed (Disyatat
and Galati, 2007). This paper contributes to this issue by presenting new evidence
on the determinants and the e¤ectiveness of the partially sterilized intervention of the
National Bank of Georgia (NBG).
A major di¢ culty in evaluating the causes and the impact of intervention in emerg-
ing market economies has always been the lack of data. High frequency data became
available only recently for some developing economies. However, the lack of available
o¢ cial data for the group of the seven poorest countries of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS-7)2 countries resulted in a gap in the existing literature. This
paper aims to ll this gap by analyzing intervention in an emerging CIS-7 economy.
This paper employs a unique daily data set that includes the precise dates and extent
of intervention operations of the NBG during the period 1996-2007.
Although the empirical literature on emerging market countries is still relatively lim-
ited, recent papers show mixed evidence on the e¤ect of intervention on the exchange
rate level and volatility.3 Domaç and Mendoza (2004) nd that the central banks of
Mexico and Turkey conducted e¤ective foreign exchange sales (but not purchases) in
inuencing the level and reducing the volatility of the exchange rates. Guimarães and
1Canales-Kriljenko (2003) identies reasons why central bank intervention in emerging markets
may have more of an impact on the exchange rate: the lack of full sterilization, the large size of
interventions relative to currency market turnover, the informational advantage of the central bank
over market participants, and moral suasion.
2The CIS-7 countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. There is no available intervention data for Armenia, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Only
monthly frequency data starting from 2000 is available for Moldova. For Georgia and Kyrgyzstan,
there is daily data starting from 2002 and 2009, respectively.
3Disyatat and Galati (2007) provide an extensive review of the existing mixed evidence on the
e¤ectiveness of intervention in emerging market countries.
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Karacadag (2004) show that sales of foreign currency have a small impact on the ex-
change rate level and increase short-term volatility in Mexico. In Turkey, intervention
does not a¤ect exchange rate levels, reducing its short-term volatility. Akinci et al.
(2005) nd that only large and isolated purchases of the foreign currency in Turkey
reduce volatility and the exchange rate level is not a¤ected. Ger ¾al and Holub (2006)
nd that intervention in the Czech Republic has only an immediate impact on the
exchange rate that lasts up to 2-3 months in some episodes. Égert (2007) shows that
short-run interventions to ease appreciation are successful in Croatia, the Czech Re-
public, Slovakia and Turkey and that intervention is not e¤ective in Romania. Partial
sterilization in Croatia does not improve the e¤ectiveness of intervention as compared
to other countriesmostly sterilized interventions. Thus, he suggests that unsterilized
intervention does not automatically inuence the exchange rate in emerging markets.
There are less studies focusing on the motives of central banks to intervene. Edison
(1993) and Almekinders (1995) survey the literature prior to 1992. In general, most of
these studies nd strong evidence for leaning against the wind (preventing the exchange
rate from moving in one direction via deliberate operations that result in its movement
in the opposite direction). However, as most of the central banks did not publish
o¢ cial high-frequency data of intervention, the results on motives di¤er across countries
depending on the proxies for the intervention variable, the data frequency, and the
methodology applied (Gersl, 2006). More recently, high frequency data is used in
the analysis of the motives of central banks to intervene in advanced economies.4 For
emerging markets, intervention determinants are studied in Akinci et al. (2005b). They
nd that the Central Bank of Turkey reacts to changes in volatility and deviations from
the long-run trend of the exchange rate.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the determinants and
e¤ectiveness of intervention in Georgia. Daily data of the NBG intervention activity
4Baillie and Osterberg (1997) nd that the probability of intervention in the USA and Germany
is determined by the deviation from targeted level and by the volatility of exchange rates. Kim and
Sheen (2002) identies similar motives for Australia.
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for the period 1996-2007 is used in the analysis. Prior to the estimation, an endogenous
search for structural breaks in the data is performed to account for the ongoing trans-
formation process in Georgia.5 This information is explicitly used in the estimation
analysis of the determinants and e¤ectiveness of intervention. In order to determine
factors that trigger the NBG intervention, daily central bank reaction functions are
estimated by OLS with lagged variables and IV. Exchange rate change is shown to
be a determinant of intervention indicating simultaneity when analyzing e¤ectiveness.
As a result, a procedure similar to the 2SLS estimation and a GARCH-M model with
lagged variables are used in addressing the e¤ectiveness of the NBG intervention.
The results suggest that partially sterilized intervention allows the NBG to inu-
ence the level and the volatility of the exchange rate. The detected structural breaks
in the exchange rate and the intervention series play a signicant role in the NBG
intervention motives and e¤ectiveness. The NBG generally leans against the wind and
wants to decrease the exchange rate volatility. The immediate e¤ect of intervention
on the exchange rate is opposite to the intention. The intended e¤ect on the level of
the exchange rate is observed the next day after the intervention is conducted. Nev-
ertheless, the e¤ectiveness-in-mean has a price, namely, the daily intervention activity
increases the volatility of the exchange rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes the method-
ologies commonly used in the literature and applied in this paper. Section 3 briey
describes intervention activity in Georgia. The data used in the estimation is described
in Section 4. Section 5 reports empirical ndings for the structural break tests in the
data, intervention determinants, and intervention e¤ectiveness. Section 6 concludes.
5The timing of country-specic events does not necessarily coincide with structural breaks in the
macroeconomic data. For example, Koµcenda (2005) nds that a break in the exchange rate occurs
before the exchange rate policy shifts in a number of European transition countries.
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1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Structural Break and Stationarity Tests
When investigating the determinants and e¤ectiveness of intervention, one has to
take into account the possibility of structural breaks in a series. Country-specic and
period-specic events often result in structural breaks in time series (Koµcenda, 2005).
When an existing break is neglected, the estimation results are inconsistent. Besides, a
break biases stationarity tests towards detecting a unit root while series are stationary
with break (broken stationary).6
There is a wide variety of structural break and broken stationarity tests in the
literature. In this paper, the Vogelsang (1997) and Perron (1989) tests are applied to
the exchange rates and to the intervention time series. The test proposed by Vogelsang
(1997) endogenously searches for a single break point in a series. The specication of
this test is robust to the unit-root dynamics of the series, does not impose restrictions
on the nature of the data and the distribution of errors, and can be applied to a general
polynomial function of time. The null hypothesis of no break against the alternative
of a break in at least one of the trend polynomials or in the intercept is tested for a
data generating process.
The break detected by the Vogelsang test is used as the expected break in the
Perron test for an exogenous structural break and the broken stationarity. The Perrons
null hypothesis is that a series has a unit root with an exogenous structural break that
occurs at a given date. The alternative hypothesis is stationarity around a deterministic
time trend with an exogenous change in the intercept and/or linear trend (broken trend
stationarity). This test is reasonably robust to the presence of GARCH errors (Brooks
and Alistair, 2002).
When data is broken trend stationary, the series become stationary after detrending
6Nelson and Plosser (1982) could not reject the null hypothesis of the unit root in macroeconomic
time series for the USA. However, Perron (1989) showed that allowing for a single break in the intersept
or the slope of the trend function, most of these series are stationary around the trend.
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with a structural change incorporated. With a detected structural break in a series,
there are two ways to proceed. First, an estimation over di¤erent sub-samples can be
performed. Another method to overcome this problem is to use a dummy variable that
represents a structural change. Depending on the nature of the break, an intercept or
a slope dummy variable is introduced. The benet of the dummy variable approach is
that no degrees of freedom will be lost through a loss of observations. In the paper,
the dummy variable approach is followed.
1.2.2 Determinants of Intervention
A number of researchers focus on the investigation of intervention motives. Ideally,
the central bank reaction function is derived from a theoretical model, typically based
on the loss function of the central bank (for example, Almekinders, 1995). However,
most studies on intervention determinants postulate a central bank reaction function
without any theoretical background (ad hoc). Both continuous and binary daily ad
hoc reaction functions are estimated in this study.
Edison (1993) and Gersl (2006) survey literature on ad hoc reaction functions. A
typical ad hoc central bank reaction function shows how intervention is dependent on
the changes in the exchange rate level, deviation from the exchange rate target, and
previous periods intervention as a proxy for unobservable factors that may inuence
intervention and controls for rst order autocorrelation that is usually found in the
intervention data. Based on the estimated coe¢ cients, the leaning-against-the-wind
(or leaning-with-the-wind) and the targeting-exchange-rate motives are tested.
Central banks react asymmetrically to appreciations and depreciations (Gersl, 2006).
Separating the appreciation and the depreciation sub-periods allows the inclusion of
a volatility7 measure in the reaction function. The direct inclusion of exchange rate
volatility into the reaction function estimated across periods with di¤erent directions of
7Squared changes in exchange rate or moving standard deviation/variance are used in the literature
as volatility measures (for example, Hillebrand and Schnabl, 2006).
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exchange rate movements is likely to lead to an insignicant coe¢ cient. Moreover, the
sign of the volatility coe¢ cient would not be clearly interpretable. The volatility mea-
sure is always positive but the same degree of volatility in the depreciation sub-period
has the opposite e¤ect on the intervention than in the appreciation sub-period.
The main problem with estimating the reaction function by OLS lies in potential
simultaneity (and endogeneity) bias. The change in the exchange rate may be to some
extent dependent on intervention. This problem is especially severe if the estimation
is conducted using low-frequency data (weekly, quarterly, or monthly). If interventions
are e¤ective, the probability of endogenous determination increases.
The usual practice to deal with the simultaneity problem is to replace the current
values of the exchange rate with lagged values (for example, Dominguez and Frankel,
1993). This method is risky when applying it to low frequency data as lagged values
of exchange rates might be correlated with the lagged intervention variable that is
included as an explanatory variable. Another possibility is to use the current and
lagged values of exchange rate as IV for the current exchange rate or to follow the
Arellano-Bond (AB, Arellano and Bond, 1991) approach. In the initial version of
the AB model, the rst di¤erences of predetermined and endogenous variables are
instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels. In this paper, all three approaches
are used to check the robustness of results.
Separating the actual decision to intervene from the decision on the amount to
intervene, binary choice models (for example, Probit and Logit models) are frequently
used to estimate the probability of intervention rather than the precise amount. The
vector of explanatory variables includes the factors that trigger but do not explicitly
refer to the direction of intervention, such as the change in the exchange rate, the devi-
ation of the exchange rate from the targeted level, and the previous days intervention
amount. The exchange rate volatility is included as an explanatory variable when the
model is estimated over a sub-sample of the exchange rate appreciation (depreciation).
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1.2.3 E¤ectiveness of Intervention
In testing the e¤ectiveness of intervention on the exchange rate level, the instru-
mental variables/the two stage least squares (IV/2SLS) approach is widely used to
account for potential endogeneity bias. For example, Égert and Komárek (2005) use
lagged intervention as an instrument for current intervention, while Disyatat and Galati
(2005) use predicted values from the reaction function as instruments. Another ap-
proach is a procedure similar to the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation (Galati,
Melick and Micu, 2005). First, the reaction function of the central bank is estimated
using the lagged exchange rate as IV for the current exchange rate, and the predicted
values are obtained. Then, the impact of intervention on the exchange rate level is es-
timated using these predicted values of intervention as IV for the current intervention.
Analyzing the e¤ectiveness of the NBG interventions, the latter approach is used. The
simultaneity problem is clearly present as the NBG leans against the wind looking at
accumulated exchange rate changes.
The IV methodology can be also used to test the portfolio balance channel of un-
sterilized and sterilized interventionse¤ects on the exchange rate (see Dominguez and
Frankel, 1993b).8 In portfolio balance theory, the risk premium equation is estimated
using the IV method to capture the potential simultaneity bias.9 Di¤erent IV that are
correlated with the spot exchange rate and actual asset suppliers, but uncorrelated with
error term, are used. For example, these are lagged intervention, news about changes
in the exchange rate policy, and secret/o¢ cial intervention dummy (Dominguez and
Frankel, 1993b).
Since the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model
8Various channels of the e¤ect of interventions on the exchange rate level and volatility are tested
in the literature. Humpage and Osterberg (1992), Dominguez and Frankel (1993b), and Baillie and
Osterberg (1997) nd a signicant portfolio balance channel; on the other hand, Dominguez and
Frankel (1993a) survey studies that do not. Dominguez (1992) conrms the signaling e¤ect, but Klein
and Rosengren (1991) nd evidence to the contrary. Dominguez (2003) argues that the central bank
interventions inuence intra-daily foreign exchange returns and volatility through information and
noise trading channels. All these studies focus on strerilized intervention.
9Humpage and Osterberg (1992) use a GARCH methodology to examine whether daily interven-
tions inuence the risk premium.
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was proposed by Bollerslev (1986), it has been widely used to analyze the impact
of intervention on the exchange rate level and volatility.10 Many studies analyze the
e¤ectiveness of intervention using a baseline GARCH (1,1) model for the change in
the exchange rate, estimating both the e¤ect of intervention on levels (in the mean
equation) and on conditional volatility (in the variance equation). Several studies (for
example, Dominguez, 1998 and Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004) extend the baseline
GARCH framework for analyzing the e¤ectiveness of intervention by introducing con-
ditional variance (standard deviation or variance in logarithmic form) into the mean
equation (GARCH-M). This class of models initially is well-suited to study asset mar-
kets as an assets riskiness can be measured as the variance of its return. In the foreign
exchange market case, the mean of an assets return (change in the exchange rate)
depends on its (logarithm of) conditional variance.11 The impact of the NBG inter-
ventions on the level and the volatility of the exchange rate is tested using GARCH-M
model.12
The commonly used conditional distributions of the error term are the Normal
(Gaussian) distribution, Students t-distribution, and the Generalized Error Distrib-
ution (GED, Nelson, 1991). Most of the empirical studies simply assume Normal or
Students distribution. The GED distribution is used to avoid the overestimation of
volatility in the case of the leptokurtic distribution of conditional volatility derived
from the data.13 This distribution is used to complete the GARCH-M specication in
this paper.
Following GARCH estimation, it is important to verify that the standardized resid-
uals are independent and identically distributed (iid). In order to test the residuals
10See Baillie and Osterberg (1997); Gersl (2006); Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004); Dominguez
(1998); Egert and Komarek (2005); Ito (2003); Hillebrand and Schnabl (2003); and many others.
11Some studies use the exponential GARCH, the threshold GARCH, and the component GARCH
models for robustness check and to account for possible asymmetries in the conditional variance
equation (for example, Égert and Komárek, 2005).
12According to Akaike and Schwarz information criteria and required restrictions on coe¢ cients,
GARCH-M is the best GARCH-type model (EGARCH, TGARCH, simple GARCH, GARCH-M).
13Rahman and Saadi (2005) show that although the day of the week e¤ect in the mean is indepen-
dent of the imposed error distribution, this result is sensitive to error distribution in the conditional
volatility case.
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iid, in this paper, two tests are applied, namely the BDS (Brock, Dechert, Scheinkman,
and LeBaron, 1996) and the Koµcenda (Koµcenda, 2001; Koµcenda and Briatka, 2005)
tests. The BDS tests null hypothesis is that the series are iid and the alternative is
unspecied. The ex ante dependence on tolerance distance and embedding dimension
represents the main weakness of the BDS test. Koµcendas alternative test eliminates
the arbitrariness in the choice of the proximity parameter leaving only the choice of
embedding dimension. In this paper, both the BDS and the Koµcenda tests are applied.
1.3 Foreign Exchange Intervention in Georgia
The Georgian economy went through a transition recession in the period 1991
1994. This recession was the deepest among all the Former Soviet Union countries. The
economy su¤ered from hyperination and general economic and political instability.
Stabilization, structural, and currency reforms were conducted in the period 1995
1996. In October 1995, a new currency, the Georgian lari, was introduced. The lari
was pegged de facto to the US dollar. Ination dropped to a single-digit rate in the
rst half of 1998.
The Russian economic crisis of 1998 had a negative impact on the Georgian econ-
omy. Russia was the main trade partner of Georgia in the period 1996-2007. The
exchange rate regime was switched to "free-oating" from early 1999. The IMF charac-
terizes the exchange rate regime in Georgia as managed oating with no predetermined
path for the exchange rate (ADB, 2007).
The NBG conducts monetary and exchange rate policies to "achieve and maintain
the purchasing power of the national currency, maintain price stability, and ensure
the liquidity, solvency, and market-based stable functioning of the nancial and credit
systems" (Organic Law of Georgia on the NBG). The NBG uses foreign exchange
intervention, open market operations with renancing loans, deposit certicates and
government notes auctions, overnight credits and overnight deposits, and minimum
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reserve requirements as policy instruments.
The NBG interventions are conducted at the Tbilisi Interbank Foreign Exchange
(TIFEX) market. The trade at the TIFEXmarket is held mostly in USD.14 The market
participants are local commercial banks and the NBG. Every working day, before the
TIFEX trade session starts, the NBG computes the demand-supply ratio for the foreign
currency from the local commercial banks based on the preliminary bids received by
the TIFEX electronic system. According to the NBG, it decides on the volume of
intervention based on this demand-supply ratio, the current economic conditions, and
the trends in monetary and foreign exchange policy. The NBG claims to intervene
mainly in order to keep the exchange rate stable and stabilize the foreign exchange
market.
The NBG aims to conduct sterilized foreign exchange intervention.15 However, due
to an underdeveloped capital market and the high cost of interest payments, the inter-
vention activity is only partially sterilized. Intervention was only partially sterilized in
the period 1996-2004. From December 1998 until the second part of 2004, following
the IMF recommendations, the NBG only purchased the US dollar to rebuild its stock
of foreign exchange reserves. However, the NBG did not sterilize its intervention in
2004.16 After 2005, the NBG continued to sterilize its intervention to account for the
increasingly large amount of capital inows. For example, the NBG sterilized three
quarters of its intervention through the newly introduced auction of deposit certicates
in 2006.17 In summary, the foreign exchange intervention activity in Georgia can be
described as only partially sterilized.
14The time series of Euro and Russian ruble interventions are much shorter and are not analyzed
in this paper.
15For references see Ination Reports, Annual Reports of the National Bank of Georgia, Asian
Development Bank Report (2007), Maliszewski (2003), and Bakradze and Billmeier (2007).
16This resulted in almost 50-percent growth rates of reserve and broad money at the end of 2004
that stabilized in 2005-2006.
17It replaced the deposit auction and securitized treasury bonds.
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1.4 Data Description
The data set used in this paper is unique. It includes precise dates and amounts of
NBG interventions (sales and purchases of the US dollar) at a daily frequency for the
period 1996-2007. This data is exclusively provided by the NBG research department.
Other time series are the daily exchange rates of the lari against the US dollar and
the Russian rubble in units of lari per one unit of foreign currency.18 Finally, the US
short-term interest rates on 1-, 3-, and 6-month certicates of deposit (time deposits)
are used. Due to the lack of daily data for Georgia, monthly interest rates on Georgian
and US time deposits are used in robustness tests.

























































































































The NBG net daily intervention and the GEL/USD exchange rate are shown
in Figure 1. The net intervention (net USD sale) is dened as the amount of USD
sold minus USD purchased by the NBG. The daily data covers the period 01/01/1996
19/04/2007. The "peak" interventions are caused by high USD demand or supply
18Both exchange rates are obtained from the NBG website (www.nbg.gov.ge).
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by local commercial banks and are not related to any specic shock or event in the
economy.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics and the stationarity tests for the GEL/USD
exchange rate (usd); the GEL/RUR exchange rate (rur); net intervention (net); and
the average short-term interest rate on the American certicates of deposit (ir). Con-
ventional stationarity tests indicate that all the series, except the US interest rate,
might be non-stationary. However, these series may be stationary with a break (bro-
ken trend stationary). In the next section, structural break and broken stationarity
tests are performed.
Table 1. Data summary statistics
usd rur net ir
Observations 2748 2748 2748 2748
Mean 1.81 0.10 -334.36 4.05
Median 1.86 0.07 0.00 5.06
Maximum 2.45 0.25 8870.00 6.75
Minimum 1.23 0.05 -89230 1.02
Std. Dev. 0.33 0.06 2137.13 1.84
Skewness -0.57 1.28 -27.23 -0.21
Kurtosis 1.96 2.71 1098.27 1.73
UR tests result mixed mixed mixed stat
Notes: The UR decision is based on the results of ADF, PP, KPSS, and WS tests at the 5%
signicance level.
1.5 Estimation Results
1.5.1 Results of Structural Break and Stationarity Tests
An endogenous search for structural breaks and a test for broken stationarity are
reported in this section. The time series are the GEL/USD exchange rate (usd), the
GEL/RUR exchange rate (rur), rst di¤erences of usd and rur (dusd; drur), and the
net intervention (net). The detected breaks in net intervention and the rst di¤erences
of exchange rates are important for the stationarity issue and for constructing dummy
variables.
First, the Vogelsang and the Perron tests are applied to the series over the whole
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period 1996-2007. Second, the focus is on the period after the change to a oating
exchange rate regime in December 1998. The results of the Vogelsang and Perron tests
are given in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
Table 2. Vogelsang test results
Variable  Test statistic 5%CV TCB Sample
usd 0.01 31.17 10.85 (18.20) 19/11/98 01/01/96-19/04/07
dusd 0.01 27.51 10.85 (18.20) 16/03/99 01/01/96-19/04/07
rur 0.01 333.50 10.85 (18.20) 26/08/98 01/01/96-19/04/07
drur 0.01 19.63 10.85 (18.20) 09/09/98 01/01/96-19/04/07
net 0.01 119.26 10.85 (18.20) 27/11/06 01/01/96-19/04/07
usd 0.15 40.68 9.00(17.88) 21/11/01 01/12/98-19/04/07
dusd 0.15 22.08 9.00(17.88) 27/12/01 01/12/98-19/04/07
Notes: H0: no break; HA: break in intercept and/or trend; order of trend polynomial p=0; K is de-
termined by the Campbell-Perron method;  is a trimming parameter; TCB is the estimated break time; 5%
critical values are given for stationary and unit root cases in parentheses (source: Vogelsang, 1997).
Table 3. Perron test results
Variable TB Test statistic 5%CV  Sample
Daily Data
usd 19/11/98 -4.59 -3.99 0.25 01/01/96-19/04/07
dusd 16/03/99 -21.10 -3.99 0.25 01/01/96-19/04/07
rur 26/08/98 -10.49 -3.99 0.23 01/01/96-19/04/07
drur 09/09/98 -19.39 -3.99 0.23 01/01/96-19/04/07
net 27/11/06 -22.26 -3.80 0.97 01/01/96-19/04/07
dnet 29/11/06 -23.52 -3.80 0.97 01/01/96-19/04/07
Notes : H0: unit root with exogenous break in trend or/and intercept, HA: broken stationarity; K is
determined by the Campbell-Perron method; TB is the predetermined break date;  is the pre-break fraction;
critical values source: Perron (1989).
To summarize the results, the Vogelsang test rejected the null hypothesis of no break
in favour of a break in the trend or the intercept. It detected two main structural breaks
(TCB in Tables 2 and 3) in both the intercept and linear trend for usd; and only in the
intercept for dusd. The rst break is a preamble to the exchange rate policy change
from a managed to a free oating regime for usd; and is after the exchange rate regime
change for dusd. The second break marks the end of the laris continuous depreciation
and is not associated with any policy step. Note that this break happens before the
lari actually started to appreciate in 2002.
The GEL/RUR exchange rate series (rur) has a structural break in both the inter-
cept and linear trend. Following the ruble denomination in January 1998, the Russian
crisis took place in August 1998. The break in the intercept of drur occurs in Septem-
ber 1998.
The net intervention series net and dnet have structural breaks in intercepts in
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November and December 2006, respectively. The NBG was purchasing large amounts
of USD, responding to a very high demand for the lari by local commercial banks. Thus,
these breaks are not connected to any exchange rate or intervention policy changes.
The Perron test indicates that daily exchange rates and net intervention series are
broken trend stationary with the breaks detected by the Vogelsang test.
1.5.2 Evidence on Determinants of Intervention
In this subsection, the determinants of the NBG intervention are examined. Daily
continuous reaction functions are estimated over three samples. The rst sample is the
whole data span 1996-2007. Second, the focus is on the sub-sample from December
1998 until September 2004 characterized by interventions of the same sign: only USD
purchases. The third period is the sub-sample February 2002 - April 2007 characterized
by continuous appreciation of the lari. The chosen sub-samples allow for the inclusion
of exchange rate volatility into the reaction function and for checking the robustness
of results.
The general specication of the continuous reaction function of the NBG net inter-
vention It at day t (the amount of USD sold minus purchased) is
It = 0 + 1(et   et 1) + 2(et   et 20) + 3(et   eTt )+
+4(et 1)
2 + 5It 1 + 6d1 + 7d2 + 8d3 + "t: (1.1)
First, the NBG may decide on the amount of intervention based on exchange rate
movements: leaning with/against the wind. This can be the same days (absolute)
change19 (et   et 1),20 and/or an accumulated change in a longer period, such as a
month21 (20 business days).
Second, the NBG may intervene if the lagged spot exchange rate deviates from
19The percentage measure of the change in the exchange rate leads to similar results.
20The NBG decides on the volume of intervention at the day t based on local commercial banks
preliminary bids.
21The one-month period follows Ito (2003). The results are robust in periods up to 3 months.
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its target eTt , which is allowed to be time-dependent and is set as a 10-day backward
moving average.22 The volatility that can trigger the decision on the interventions
amount is measured as squared changes in the exchange rate as in Hillebrand and
Schnabl (2006). The variable It 1 is the previous days intervention that is expected
to inuence the current intervention amount.
Finally, three dummies are included to capture the e¤ect of the detected structural
breaks in intercepts of (et   et 1) and It. Dummy variables are a common way of
solving the issue of structural breaks, as they do not involve splitting the data.
d1 =
8><>: 1; t < 27=11=060; t  27=11=06
9>=>; ; d2 =
8><>: 1; t < 16=03=990; t  16=03=99
9>=>; ;
d3 =
8><>: 1; t < 27=12=010; t  27=12=01
9>=>; : (1.2)
The specications of the reaction functions estimated over three periods are imbedded
in (1.1). They di¤er in the inclusion of the exchange rate volatility and dummies.
Namely, the volatility measure is not included into the regression (4 = 0) for the
whole sample.23 The second reaction function is estimated over the period 07/12/1998
- 14/09/2004 when the NBG was only purchasing USD. Exchange rate volatility is
introduced, and 6 = 0. Finally, the third reaction function is estimated over the lari
appreciation period 26/02/2002 - 19/04/2007, where 7 = 8 = 0 and 4 6= 0.
First, these reaction functions are estimated by OLS over three periods with current
values of the exchange rate replaced with lagged values. Then, the lagged and current
values are used as instruments for the rst three variables in period t.24 As to volatility,
it is not assumed to be exogenous, but is believed to be to some extent dependent on
22The targeted level of the exchange rate is usually set to the moving average of the spot exchange
rate or to the purchasing power parity equilibrium level (Gersl, 2006; Ito, 2003; Akinci et al., 2005).
23In fact, the volatility coe¢ cient turns out to be insignicant in the regression estimated over the
whole sample.
24The AB approach for the reaction function does not give signicant results.
18
the intervention activity. Thus, the lagged volatility is included.25
Table 4. Continuous reaction functions for the whole period 01/01/1996-19/04/2007
Estimation method:OLS Estimation method:IV
IVs:et 1;20et 1;T et 1
Const -2322.12 Const -3311.68***
et 1 -1777.66 et 3336.05**
20et 1 2028.04*** 20et 572.14***
T et 1 1447.15*** T et 1596.24**
It 1 0.16* It 1 0.12
d1 2015.75*** d1 3225.65***
d2 758.83** d2 -60.81***
d3 -285.72*** d3 -153.84***
R2 = 0:07 DW = 2 R2 = 0:1 DW = 1:99
BGLM 0.49 BGLM 0.67
ARCHLM 0.15 ARCHLM 0.27
Notes : ; 20;T are one-period change, twenty-period change, and one-period change from the target,
respectively.*=signicance at 10%; **=signicance at 5%;***=signicance at 1%; BGLM is the Breusch-
Godfrey serial correlation LM test; ARCHLM is the ARCH LM test.
The results of OLS and IV estimation and specication tests are given in Tables
4 and 5. Overall, the structural break intercept dummy variables are signicant. The
detected structural breaks change the regression intercept. The most important struc-
tural break is associated with the increase in the NBG intervention operations.
There is the evidence of leaning against the wind in response to one-month accu-
mulated changes in the exchange rate over the whole sample. The NBG leans against
the wind based on the changes in the spot exchange rate but not on the previous days
changes in the exchange rate.
The NBG clearly leans against the wind in the sub-sample of USD purchases. It
buys less USD when the lari depreciates and more USD when the lari appreciates.
In the sub-sample when the lari continuously appreciates, the previous days leaning-
against-the-wind motive is only marginally signicant. The immediate and one-month
accumulated motives are signicant in the IV estimation results.
The exchange rate volatility in the sub-sample of USD purchases is a signicant
determinant of intervention at only the 10% level. Note that its sign is not clearly
interpretable as the lari rst depreciated and then appreciated. In the lari appreciation
sub-sample, the NBG clearly attempts to decrease volatility.26
25The instrumented current volatility with its lags leads to roughly similar results.
26Estimation over the lari depreciation period also indicates smoothing volatility as the NBG inter-
vention motive.
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The results give clear evidence that the NBG is expected to intervene if the spot
exchange rate deviates from the target exchange rate in the full sample and in the
appreciation sub-samples. However, there is no targeting motive during the USD-
purchases period.
Table 5. Continuous reaction functions for sub-samples
Sub-sample of USD purchases: 07/12/98-14/09/04 Sub-sample of GEL appreciation: 26/02/02-19/04/07
Estimation method:OLS Estimation method:IV Estimation method:OLS Estimation method:IV
IVs:et 1;20et 1;T et 1 IVs:et 1;20et 1;T et 1
Const -2304.97*** Const 4784.35 Const -4519.03*** Const -315.42***
et 1 1083.74*** et 2687.43*** et 1 4778.02* et 5358.73***
20et 1 271.06** 20et 5183.80** 20et 1 4273.76 20et 870.82***
T et 1 -1029.24*** T et 344.669 T et 1 515.23** T et 174.40***
It 1 0.55*** It 1 0.61*** It 1 0.10 It 1 0.25***
d2 156.12** d2 108.278 d1 3168.91*** d1 -37.15






R2 = 0:44 DW = 2:12 R2 = 0:43 DW = 2:18 R2 = 0:09 DW = 1:99 R2 = 0:14 DW = 1:99
BGLM 0 BGLM 0 BGLM 0.99 BGLM 0.37
ARCHLM 0 ARCHLM 0 ARCHLM 0.56 ARCHLM 0.63
Notes : ; 20;T are one-period change, twenty-period change, and one-period change from the target, respectively.
*=signicance at 10%; **=signicance at 5%;***=signicance at 1%; in the case of detected autocorrelation and/or het-
eroscedasticity, the robust White or Newey-West standard errors are calculated.
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the binary reaction function. First, a
Logit model27 is estimated over the whole sample with dependent variable Dt that
equals one if intervention took place and zero otherwise. The probability to intervene
is estimated via the maximum likelihood from the model
P (Dt = 1 j xt) = F (xt); (1.3)
where F is a logistic cumulative distribution function. The vector of explanatory vari-
ables xt includes the (lagged) short-term and medium-term change in the exchange
rate, the deviation of exchange rate from the targeted level, and the previous days
intervention amount. Second, the model is estimated separately for the period of lari
appreciation, adding the lagged and the exchange rate volatility to the list of explana-
tory variables.
27The Probit estimation gives similar results.
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Table 6. Binary reaction functions
Sample: 01/01/1996-19/04/2007 Sub-sample of GEL appreciation: 26/02/02-19/04/07
Const 8.53*** Const -3.37***
et 1 5.80** et 1 31.20***
20et 1 5.95*** 20et 1 1.19
T et 1 4.00*** T et 1 41.96***
It 1 -2.4210 4*** Dt 1 -1.69***
d1 0.62** d1 1.16***
d2 -1.63*** (et 1)2 519.02***
d3 0.21**
McFR2 = 0:27 %CP = 71:29 McFR2 = 0:31 %CP = 73:37
Notes : ; 20;T are one-period, twenty-period changes, and a one-period change from the target re-
spectively. Estimation method: ML - Binary Logit (Newton-Raphson); *=signicance at 10%;**=signicance
at 5%;***=signicance at 1%.
In the regression estimated over the whole sample, rst, the results give evidence
that the NBG intervenes when the exchange rate deviates from a targeted value (scale
factor 0.247). Second, the negative value of the lagged intervention coe¢ cient implies
that an increase in the previous days amount of USD sold decreases the probability of
the response. The probability to intervene increases with the short- and medium-run
depreciation rate. In the sample of the lari appreciation (scale factor 0.243), both the
previous periods deviation from the target and the short-run exchange rate change
increase the probability to intervene. The volatility is also a signicant determinant of
the decision to intervene. In line with the continuous reaction function evidence, the
structural break (in intercept) dummy variables change the regression intercept.
1.5.3 Evidence on the E¤ectiveness of Intervention
1.5.3.1 Impact on the Exchange Rate Level
Immediate (one day) and short-run (two to four days) impacts of the intervention
on the changes in the exchange rate level over one-, two-, and three-day periods are
estimated.
et = 1 +
4X
i=0
iIt i + 2dirt 1 + 3e
RUR
t 1 + 4d1 + 5d2 + 6d3 + 7d4 + "t: (1.4)
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The dummies are dened as in (1.2) and the dummy variable for the GEL/RUR
structural break is
d4 =
8><>: 1; t < 09=09=980; t  09=09=98
9>=>; : (1.5)
The change in the exchange rate is expected to be dependent on the volume of
the current and lagged NBG intervention. The (lagged) changes in the US interest
rate on deposits (dirt 1) and the GEL/RUR exchange rate (eRURt 1 ) are included as
other explanatory variables. Intuitively, if the foreign interest rate goes up, domestic
certicates of deposits are substituted with foreign ones, resulting in depreciation pres-
sure on the local currency. On the other hand, when the lari depreciates towards any
important substitute currency (the ruble), then an investor wants to switch away from
the lari to any other strong currency (the USD). This is likely to have an impact on
changes in the GEL/USD exchange rate. Russia was the main trade partner of Georgia
during the period 1996-2007 (76% of Georgian foreign trade in 2006).
Intervention depends on the current and one-month accumulated change in the
exchange rate as suggested by the estimated reaction function (1.1). In order to avoid
bias in 0 in (1.4) the following procedure is applied. First, the daily reaction function
(1.1) is re-estimated over the period 1996-2007 by IV with only signicant variables left
and the predicted values are obtained. Second, (1.4) is estimated using the predicted
values from the reaction function as instruments for the intervention.
Table 7 shows the estimation results of three regressions over the period 01/01/1996-
19/04/2007.28 The structural break dummy variables are insignicant and are not
reported. Changes in the exchange rate regime, in the direction of exchange rate
movements, and in the size of intervention do not inuence the e¤ectiveness-in-mean
of intervention.
28The results are all robust to the lari-appreciation and the USD-purchases sub-samples.
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Table 7. Daily impact of intervention on the GEL/USD exchange rate level
Variable Regression I: et Regression II: et   et 2 Regression III: et   et 3
IVs: [It 1; [It 2; [It 3; [It 4; dIt 5
Const 0.02*** 2.22E-03*** 3.81E-03***
It 8.13E-06** 0.01** 1.23E-03***
It 1 -1.00E-06 -4.36E-07 -1.29E-06
It 2 -9.75E-09 -2.73E-08 2.30E-07
It 3 -7.34E-07* -6.29E-07* -8.19E-07*
It 4 -6.09E-07* -5.87E-07* -1.06E-06*
dirt 1 1.82E-03 -3.87E-04 8.50E-04
eRURt 1 2.11*** 2.19*** 2.63***
R2 0.28 0.14 0.11
Notes : bIi are predicted values from the reaction function with only 5%-signicant variables; sample:
01/01/1996-19/04/2007; estimation method: IV; *=signicance at 10%; **=signicance at 5%;***=signi-
cance at 1%; In regressions I, II and IV, the F-test indicates that all intervention variables are signicant at
the 1% level.
There is no desired impact of intervention on the changes in the exchange rate level
before three days. The immediate e¤ect of intervention on the exchange rate changes
is opposite to what is intended. It is shown that the NBG decides on the amount
of intervention based on the USD demand-supply ratio from preliminary bids from
commercial banks. The amount of the intervention does inuence the actual exchange
rate change, pushing it further in its trend. This could be explained by imperfect
information, or other factors might push the exchange rate in the opposite direction.
However, this unintended e¤ect lasts only one day. Already after two days, the NBG
pushes the exchange rate in the desired direction (leans against the wind). The third
and fourth days interventions are e¤ective at the 10% signicance level.
The insignicant coe¢ cient of the change in the US interest rate on deposits sug-
gests that substitution from domestic to foreign deposits does not create signicant
depreciation pressure on the lari. This coe¢ cient has the expected positive sign in two
specications. For robustness the check, the spread between American and Georgian
interest rates was used. Due to the lack of Georgian data, this robustness check was
performed using monthly frequency data. The coe¢ cient 2 remains insignicant when
the same specication is used.
The coe¢ cient 3 on the changes in GEL/RUR is signicantly positive. When the
lari depreciates towards the ruble, then an investor wants to switch away from the lari
to the USD, which is a strong substitute currency in the investors portfolio. Thus, the
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demand for the US dollar increases, and the lari also depreciates towards the USD.
1.5.3.2 Impact on the Exchange Rate Level and Volatility
In this sub-section the e¤ects of intervention on the level of the GEL/USD ex-
change rate and on the conditional volatility are analyzed within the GARCH-M
framework. This specication allows analyzing the e¤ectiveness of intervention by
introducing conditional variance into the mean equation. The GARCH-M model is
specied as follows:
et = 0 + 1It 1 + 2 ln vt + 3dirt 1 + 3e
RUR
t 1 + (1.6)
+5d1 + 6d2 + 7d3 + 8d4 + "t;
"t j 
t 1  GED;
vt = 0 + 1"
2
t 1 + 2vt 1 + 3jIt 1j+ 4dirt 1+
+5e
RUR
t 1 + 6d1 + 7d2 + 8d3 + 9d4 + ut:
In this specication, the level change in the GEL/USD exchange rate level (et ) and
the conditional volatility (vt ) depend on the lagged values of intervention (It 1) to
control for simultaneity bias.29 The second explanatory variable in the mean equation
(ln vt ) allows for the possibility that changes in the logarithm of variance inuence
the conditional mean. The (lagged) change in the US interest rate on deposits (dirt 1)
and the GEL/RUR exchange rate (eRURt 1 ) are included as other explanatory variables
similar to (1.4). In the conditional variance equation, the intervention variable is
included in the absolute value form as in Dominguez (1998).
Table 8 shows the results of the GARCH-M estimation over the period 01/01/1996-
19/04/200730 and of the diagnostic tests. The rst three explanatory variables included
in the conditional variance equation are highly signicant, indicating that the parame-
29The IV estimation using the tted values from the reaction function leads to similar results.
30The results are all robust to the lari-appreciation and the USD-purchases sub-samples.
24
ters have explanatory power in the daily model. The ARCH term, which reects the
impact of surprises from previous periods on the volatility, is signicant and positive.
The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on the lagged conditional variance, 2, is about 0.6
and highly signicant, indicating that the variance e¤ect is highly persistent. The
restrictions for the stability and non-negativity of variance are satised.






















R2 = 0:07 DW =1.90
Arch LM test Not reject H0
BDS independence test Not reject H0
The Kocenda test Reject H0
Notes : The BDS test is performed for m=2,3,4,5 and di¤erent values of ; the critical values for 2500
observations are used (source: Kanzler, 1999). The Koµcenda test is performed for m=2,3,4,5 and the optimal
range of "; the critical values for 2500 observations are used (source: Koµcenda and Briatka, 2005). Sam-
ple: 01/01/1996-19/04/2007; estimation method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) Generalized error distribution;
Q-tests indicate no remaining serial autocorrelation in residuals; *=signicance at 10%;**=signicance at
5%;***=signicance at 1%.
The conditional distribution of errors is GED. The regressions diagnostics indicate
that there is no remaining GARCH in errors. Standardized residuals are iid according
to the BDS test. However, they are not iid by Koµcendas test. This provides additional
support for using GED in the model.
The structural break dummy variables are signicant in both mean and variance
equations. The structural breaks of 1998-1999 in the GEL/USD and GEL/RUR ex-
change rates strongly contribute to the intercept change in the mean equation. The
smallest (in absolute value) impact on the mean-equations regression intercept is from
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the non-institutional break in the GEL/USD exchange rate of 2001. In the variance
equation, the impacts of all four structural break dummy variables are signicant and
smaller than in the mean equation.
The impact of (lagged) intervention on the exchange rate level is consistent with
the leaning-against-the-wind-motive. Thus, the NBG is successful in inuencing and
preventing the exchange rate from moving in one direction via deliberate operations
that result in its movement in the opposite direction. This result is in line with the mar-
ginal evidence from the IV estimation results. Holding other factors xed, if conditional
variance is 10% higher, the change in the exchange rate level is 0.000095 points lower.
That is, the increased riskiness measured by the conditional variance acts to decrease
the pace of depreciation, and thus, increases the return on the currency "asset".
The results suggest that the NBG intervention activity increases conditional volatil-
ity.31 Regardless of the direction of the intervention (sales or purchases of USD), the
presence of the NBG at the TIFEX market increases the volatility of the exchange
rate. The reaction function estimation results indicate that the NBG aims to decrease
volatility. The volatility measure is insignicant in the reaction function estimated over
the whole period but is signicant when estimated over sub-samples of appreciation
and depreciation. Equation (1.6) was also estimated over the lari appreciation and
depreciation sub-samples. In both cases, intervention activity increases conditional
volatility.32
In line with the IV estimation results, the change in the GEL/RUR exchange rate is
signicantly positive related to the change in the GEL/USD exchange rate level. More-
over, conditional volatility increases with an increase in the change in the GEL/RUR
exchange rate. The e¤ect on the conditional volatility is much smaller than on the
change in the GEL/USD level.
In contrast with the IV estimation results, the coe¢ cient of the changes in the US
interest rate is now signicant and positive. An increase in the US interest rate on time
31This is a common nding in the intervention literature (for example, Dominguez, 1998).
32The results of reaction function estimation are robust to the volatility measure.
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deposits is associated with the depreciation of the lari. Interestingly, an increase in
the US interest rate on deposits leads to a decrease in the conditional volatility. This
e¤ect is smaller than on the change of the GEL/USD level. Similarly to IV estimation,
a robustness check was performed with monthly data on the short-term interest rate
spread between USD and GEL. The coe¢ cients 3 and 4 in (1.6) have the same signs
and similar magnitude.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes partially sterilized foreign exchange intervention in Georgia.
The existing evidence on developing countries is scanty, mixed, and complicated by
severe data limitations (Disyatat and Galati, 2007). This paper contributes to the
literature by presenting evidence on the determinants and e¤ectiveness of National
Bank of Georgia interventions using daily data for the period 1996-2007.
Detected structural breaks in the exchange rate and the intervention series have
a signicant impact on the way the NBG reacts to changes in the exchange rate and
volatility. On the other hand, the breaks a¤ect the impact of intervention on the
level and the conditional volatility in the GARCH-M, but not in the IV, estimation.
The breaks in the exchange rates are a result of the Russian crisis in 1998. The
NBG responded to these breaks by changing the exchange rate regime to free oating.
Another break in the exchange rate with the US dollar is caused by increased demand
for the lari by local commercial banks. This was a preamble to the laris continuous
appreciation.
The demand for US dollars in Georgia is inuenced by the exchange rate of the
lari towards the Russian ruble and by the US interest rate on deposits. When the lari
weakens towards the RUR, the demand for USD increases. When investments become
more attractive in the US than in Georgia, the demand for USD increases as well. This
increase creates depreciation pressure on the lari.
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The NBG leans against the wind and aims to decrease the exchange rate volatility.
Overall, the NBG purchases US dollars to limit the appreciation and the volatility of the
lari. This aims to contribute to international trade and to attract foreign investment.
The central bank leans against the wind according to the changes in the spot and the
accumulated exchange rate changes. When the NBG only purchases USD, the Bank
also looks at the previous days changes in the exchange rate. During the periods
of the laris appreciation and depreciation, the NBG intervenes to "calm a disorderly
market".
There is a daily-frequency connection between the partially sterilized intervention
and the level of the exchange rate. The NBG is generally successful in its leaning-
against-the-wind intervention activity. According to the GARCH-M estimation results,
the desired e¤ect is observed already the next day after the intervention is conducted.
The immediate impact of intervention is opposite to the intention. There is weak
evidence of the interventions e¤ectiveness-in-mean with a two-day lag according to the
IV estimation results. The depreciation trend of the exchange rate is clearly supported
by the NBG intervention activity until 2002. With strong capital inows, the NBG
only decreases the pace of the exchange rate appreciation.
On the other hand, the NBG is not successful in "calming a disorderly market".
The NBGs frequent interventions increase exchange rate volatility. Intervening too
often alters the exchange rate oat and is costly. Fear of oating disappears over time
in Georgia. This calls for less frequent foreign exchange interventions. Intervention is
cost e¤ective in the presence of large shocks, as their xed costs are often lower than
the costs of other policies (Lahiri and Vegh, 2001).
Overall, the NBG faces the challenge of choosing between limiting exchange rate
appreciation and controlling ination. During the period considered in this paper,
1996-2007, the focus of the NBG was mainly to limit appreciation and less to control
ination. Due to the high dollarization and remittances, this policy has negative e¤ects
on the welfare of the country. The NBG should focus more on ination using foreign
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exchange intervention to smooth short-term uctuations due to large shocks. From
May 2009, the NBG committed to an increase in exchange rate exibility by limiting
its foreign exchange intervention (IMF, 2009).
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Dollarization in Emerging Markets: New
Evidence from Georgia
Abstract:
This paper studies dollarization using the implications of three versions of a money-
in-utility function model. These versions accentuate the roles of the exchange rate, the
interest rates on foreign and domestic currencies time deposits, and domestic and
foreign ination. Monthly Georgian data for the period 1996 - 2007 is employed in the
analysis. Findings indicate that the US dollar is a strong substitute for the domestic
currency. Moreover, the dollar has a signicant share in domestic liquidity services.
The historical dollarization is well explained by the exchange rate model, which implies
that the exchange rate is the best predictor of dollarization.
Keywords: Dollarization, Georgia, Money-in-utility function
JEL classication: C51, E41, F31
2.1 Introduction
Dollarization or currency substitution33 is a common feature of emerging markets
characterized by a history of macroeconomic instability. Dollarization is a matter of
concern for policymakers, as it leads to reducing the e¤ects of domestic monetary
and scal policies. Currency substitution was a very popular topic in the academic
33The paper uses dollarization (currency substitution) to refer to the uno¢ cial process in which
the national currency, as a means of circulation and wealth accumulation, is substituted with a more
stable foreign currency or several currencies (Calvo & Vegh, 1996).
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literature of 1970s and 1980s. Recently, the issue of dollarization in a number of
developing economies has again gained increasing attention. However, this issue is still
understudied for CIS-7 countries mainly due to the lack of high frequency data.
In the CIS-7 economies, large amounts of US dollars are held by the public. Signi-
cant de-dollarization has not yet occurred in these countries despite the recent progress
in macroeconomic stabilization. Georgia is one of these economies, in which currency
crises along with a history of hyperination resulted in dollarization.34 The current
level of dollarization remains high even with moderate ination and a stable exchange
rate. This paper studies the signicance of dollarization in Georgia and rationalizes its
level for the period 1996-2007.
Money demand in multi-currency economy is specied based on a theoretical models
implications in the literature. The theoretical models of money demand are cash-in-
advance (CIA), transaction costs, and ad hoc models.35 This paper species a bench-
mark model with total money (liquidity) holdings in a utility function (MIUF). Total
money is a constant elasticity of substitution function of foreign and domestic curren-
cies that households hold. Both foreign and domestic money are useful for reducing
transaction costs.
In order to study dollarization from di¤erent perspectives, three versions of the
benchmark model are formulated in this paper. These models accentuate the role of
ination, exchange rate, and time depositsinterest rate. It is shown that dollarization
exhibits behavior that is related to the partial e¤ects of exchange rate depreciation,
ination and interest rate di¤erentials. In addition, the partial e¤ect models are modi-
ed to account for exogenous news about dollarization. The exogenous process of news
is approximated by accumulated knowledge on dollarization in previous periods. This
34In Georgia, the US dollar has the largest share (85-90%) in total foreign currency holdings.
35In ad hoc models, the demand and substitutability of both currencies are specied a priori. The
CIA model illustrates what determines currency substitutability but neither currency serves as a store
of value. In countries with underdeveloped nancial markets money is an important store of value.
Dollarization can be empirically analyzed as this value is observable. In a transaction costs model,
money facilitates consumption purchases. Money is more liquid than other assets highlighting the
role of the store of value (for discussion see Giovanni and Turtelboom, 1992).
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aims to capture not just the role of the fundamentals, but all possible factors that
inuenced the dollarization process in the past.
In the empirically oriented research, currency substitutability is estimated using var-
ious categories of model.36 The most recent category of models deals with the agents
dynamic optimization (Imrohoroglu, 1994; Bufman and Leiderman, 1993; Friedman
and Verbetsky, 2001). These empirical models are the closest to an underlying theo-
retical model. Based on rst order optimization conditions, the parameters of consumer
preferences are jointly estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM, Hansen,
1982).37 This paper estimates both the elasticity of substitution between two curren-
cies and the share of each currency in domestic liquidity. The GMM estimation is
performed using information sets of observables consistent with each version of the
benchmark model.
In order to rationalize the actual dollarization in Georgia, three versions of the
benchmark model are compared. The models implied dollarization is calculated us-
ing the estimated parameter values. Three versions of a benchmark model imply that
domestic and foreign ination, the exchange rate depreciation, and interest rates on
savings in both currencies inuence the decision to switch to a foreign currency. In
addition to these macroeconomic indicators, the dollarization dynamics can be inu-
enced by the exogenous process of accumulated knowledge on dollarization in previous
periods. The evolution of actual dollarization is compared to the dollarization level
implied by the ination, the interest and the exchange rate models as well as by their
modied versions. This allows identifying the exchange rate as the best predictor of
dollarization.
36For example, money demand functions for domestic and foreign currencies are derived from a two-
period portfolio balance model (Cuddington, 1983). Another model is a sequential portfolio balance
model (Miles, 1978).
37Bufman and Leiderman (1993) estimate a model for Israel using a non-expected utility model.
Imrohoroglu (1994) estimates currency substitution between the Canadian and the US dollar. Selcuk
(1997) applies the same model for the Turkish case. Friedman and Verbetsky (2001) consider dollar-
ization in Russia. Mulligan and Nijsse (2001) examine currency substitution in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania. A study on Bolivia can be found in Cuddington, Garcia, and Westbrook
(2002). Selcuk (2003) provides empirical evidence for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Jordan,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic.
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The results show that dollarization is of signicant importance in Georgia. Monthly
Georgian data gives support to the MIUF model specication with transaction costs
reducing role of money. The GMM estimates indicate that the demand for US dollars
is responsive to the uctuations in the exchange rate, ination, and interest rates.
The share of US-dollar denominated money in Georgianstotal liquidity is signicant.
The US dollar holdings have a 60% share in total domestic liquidity. The US dollar
is a good substitute for the domestic currency in terms of transaction cost reduction.
The implied elasticity of substitution between two currencies is greater than unity.
When news are introduced, the demand for the dollar becomes less responsive to the
uctuations in the exchange rate due to learning adjustment. Partial e¤ect models
with ination and interest rates predict lower and more volatile dollarization than the
actual case in the economy. The actual dollarization is well explained by the exchange
rate partial e¤ect model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the economy model. Section
3 describes the data. Empirical ndings are presented in Section 4. The dynamics of
dollarization is studied in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Benchmark Model
An endowment economy consists of innitely living identical agents. At the be-
ginning of each period, each agent decides how much to consume ct = CtNPt ; how much




(domestic and foreign personal accounts and demand deposits), and how




that earn nominal interest rates it and it . Each individual receives an
exogenous endowment Yt
NPt
. Variable Pt is the price of the consumption good in terms
of the domestic currency, P t is the foreign price, N is the population that is constant
over time.
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discount factor  < 1. The utility function is a reduced form of a more complex prob-
lem, in which households can shop more e¢ ciently and increase leisure time by holding
more money. The money-in-utility-function approach is empirically convenient and al-
lows comparison with other studies that estimate the elasticity of currency substitution
and its share in liquidity services in various countries.



















































The rst order conditions for the problem are


















The term Ux(t) denotes the marginal utility of x at time t. Marginal utilities Um(t)
and Um(t) show a transaction cost reducing role of real money balances at period t in
domestic and foreign currencies, respectively. In (2.9) and (2.10), the marginal utility
of holding one unit of real money balances plus the discounted next period marginal
utility a¤orded by the real balances at time t are balanced by the marginal utility loss
at time t.
The utility function follows Kydland and Prescott (1982) and is non-separable in
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This function is a constant relative risk aversion in the consumption and money
services function. The parameter  > 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and
1

is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The parameter  reects the transaction
requirement of total money in a broad sense. This form of the utility function reects
the motive for holding money: to reduce transaction costs in implementing e¢ cient
consumption plans. It highlights the link between the total liquidity services and
e¢ cient consumption. The additive in consumption and the money services utility
function, in contrast, would break this linkage.
The total liquidity services function is the following CES function similar to the





(1  ')m t + '(mt ) 
  1
 :
In this specication, ' 2 (0; 1),  2 ( 1;1); and  6= 0. This functional form
allows identifying the role of foreign money in total liquidity in two ways. First,




. Second, the distribution parameter ' is the share of foreign
currency in the production of total domestic liquidity services.
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Um = '(1  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where a = (1  );and b = (1 )(1 )  .
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2.2.1 Three Model Specications
Three partial e¤ects of observables on the degree of dollarization are studied in
this paper. First is the partial e¤ect of foreign and domestic inations on the domestic
to foreign money ratio. Second is the partial e¤ect of the changes in the exchange rate
on dollarization. Third, the partial e¤ect of the foreign and domestic currency time
deposit interest rates on dollarization is considered. These three di¤erent model speci-
cations allow us to look at dollarization from di¤erent prospectives under alternative
assumptions.
The rst partial e¤ect models rst version will be referred to as the ination model,
version one - model 1.1. In this model, there are no saving opportunities and ination
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:
These equations are rearranged in such a way that the variables enter the modied
equations as ratios ("one minus growth rate" form) indicating the lack of signicant


















































The optimality condition that will be used in GMM estimation38 for this ination
















The optimal domestic to foreign money ratio shows the degree of dollarization in
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, and domestic and foreign ination in the next period t+1, t+1. The parameters
of interest are the share of foreign currency in the production of domestic liquidity
services ', the transaction requirement of money in broad sense parameter , and 




The optimality condition for the rst version of the second model - exchange rate
model 2.1- is derived in a similar way. First order conditions (2.9) and (2.10) are com-
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38Joint estimation of the consumer preferences parameters in the system of equations 2.3.1a-2.4.1a
gives a similar result as the single-equation estimation of model 1.1.
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consumption-money ratios and parameters.
In contrast to the ination and exchange rate models 1.1 and 2.1, saving opportu-
nities are introduced in interest rate model 3.1. Interest rate model 3.1 divides money
into current accounts and demand deposit (more liquid money) mt and mt , and cer-








The optimality condition for interest rate model 3.1 is
(1  1 + it+1
1 + it+1
) = [(1  ')(mt
mt
)  + '] 1(1  )f' ct
mt









and the optimal money ratio at period t is now a function of consumption-money ratios,
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2.2.2 Modied Versions of the Models
In the rst version of each partial-e¤ect model in (2.12), (2.14), and (2.16) derived
above, the share of foreign currency in domestic liquidity services is a xed parameter.
In this subsection, two modied versions of each partial e¤ect model are presented.
That is, each partial e¤ect model has three versions. The conclusions of this paper are
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built on the set of three versions of three partial e¤ect models.
In two of the modied versions, the assumption of the xed parameter ' is relaxed.
Now, the share of foreign currency in the production of domestic liquidity services
' changes over time. Agents make decisions over consumption and money holdings
knowing the past dollarization share DRt in the economy. The shortcut for this type
of learning is to substitute the share of foreign currency in total money services by an
exogenous process of "news" about dollarization. This means that agents update the
parameters of their preferences after they "read the news" about dollarization. The
process of news can be noisy, which gives an additional source of disturbances in the
GMM estimation of the parameters.




. Agents update the parameters of their preferences after they
"read the news" that dollarization is the same as it was in the previous period. This
process of news is exogenous. Using the actual data on dollarization shares, DRt is
calculated using dollarization ratios. Version 2 of the ination model 1 - model 1.2 - is




















In the third version, individuals act as econometricians by learning the share of
foreign currency in money services using the previous periodsdata on dollarization
shares. This aims to capture the inertia in the agents foreign currency holdings.
Knowledge is accumulated through the use of foreign currency by domestic agents
in previous periods. A proxy for such knowledge at time t is the tted value of the
dollarization ratio obtained by the regression on its lags. The idea behind this proxy
is that the knowledge of foreign currency is proportional to the amounts of foreign
currency previously used.39 That is, dollarization in the economy persists because
39It is assumed that knowledge accumulates equally from all foreign deposits.
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agents constantly utilize the accumulated knowledge on foreign currency use. Each
individual runs the regression
DRt = +DRt 11 + ::+DRt pp + "t;
with p being the number of lags. The one-step-ahead forecast dDRt=t 1 is obtained
by OLS estimation under general assumptions. Fitted values are the share of foreign
currency in the money services.
















Modied versions for the exchange rate and the interest rate models are expressed
in a similar way.
2.3 Data
The sample period is January 1996 - November 2007 with monthly frequency
observations. Foreign nominal money balances are measured by the sum of the US
dollar-denominated personal accounts and demand deposits held in Georgian banks
by nono¢ cial, non-bank residents. The domestic nominal money balances are mea-
sured as the sum of the Georgian currency (lari)-denominated personal accounts and
demand deposits in local banks. Adding cash outside the banking system would be an
even more accurate measure of liquid money. However, the data on foreign currency
holdings outside the banking system is not available for Georgia. This is a common
"unobservability" problem in the dollarization literature (Calvo and Vegh, 1992). Var-
ious proxies are usually used in the literature depending on the dollarization measure
specication. Some studies use estimates of foreign cash holdings (Feige and Dean,
2004; Feige et al., 2000, Feige, 2003). The domestic to foreign money ratio is calcu-
lated using observable liquid money on personal accounts from which deposited funds
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can be withdrawn at any time without any notice or penalty.
As a proxy for monthly consumption seasonally adjusted pure energy consumption
is used.40 Goods and services consumption is highly correlated with electricity con-
sumption quarterly series. The annual growth rates of these two series have similar
trends over the sample period. The pure energy consumption series are taken from the
Georgian electricity distribution company Telasis statistics.
Both foreign and domestic money balances and consumption are converted to real
per capita terms by dividing by population and domestic prices. The domestic prices
are the seasonally adjusted consumer price index. The civilian population is obtained
from the World Population record. The GEL/USD exchange rate series is taken from
the NBG database. The interest rates are domestic- and foreign currency-denominated
term deposit interest rates. All these series are taken from the National Bank of Georgia
statistical bulletins. The foreign price index is the US consumer price index obtained
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 1 shows the dollarization share, and ination and depreciation rates for the
Georgian economy for the period 1996-2007. The dollarization share is calculated as
the real per capita sum of the foreign currency-denominated personal accounts and
demand deposits over the sum of the domestic and foreign currency deposits.
Figure 2 shows the shares of the US dollar and Euro in the total dollarization share
in the economy in recent years. These are the main foreign currencies in the total ratio.
The shares of other currency deposits (RUB, GBP and CHF) are less than 1%. The
US dollar holdings are signicantly larger in amount compared to the Euro.
Table 1 provides summary statistics, and the stationarity and structural break























40The data on the monthly consumption of goods and services and the share of electricity consump-
tion by household are not available for Georgia.
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Obs 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
Mean 0.995 1.505 0.975 0.008 0.009 0.671 0.716
Median 1 1.370 0.986 0.008 0.002 0.275 0.784
Maximum 1.211 13.627 1.053 0.022 0.191 8.579 0.886
Minimum 0.949 -1.247 0.874 0.001 0.000 0.128 0.104
Std. Dev. 0.029 1.716 0.034 0.006 0.023 1.208 0.185
Skewness 4.554 3.662 -0.389 0.319 5.006 3.878 -1.801
Kurtosis 29.100 21.956 -0.245 -1.068 31.032 17.013 2.559
UR/break broken trend broken trend stationary stationary stationary stationary stationary
tests resulta stationary stationary
aThe decision is based on the results of ADF, PP, KPSS, Vogelsang and Perron tests at the 5%
signicance level.
2.4 Evidence on Dollarization: Empirical Findings
The estimation results for models 1, 2 and 3 and their three versions are obtained
using the GMM procedure. This methodology is robust to conditional heteroscedastic-
ity and autocorrelation. Alternative instrument sets are used to check the sensitivity
of the results to the choice of instruments. Instruments are lags of observables that






















































































The results are given in Tables 2, 3, 4. In each case, the number of orthogonality
conditions is greater than the number of parameters. The validity of these overidentify-
ing restrictions is tested using J-statistics. The null hypothesis is that the restrictions
are satised, and the test statistic is distributed assymthotically as 2 with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). The
Hansen J-statistics are insignicant for all models, thus their validity is not rejected.
41The estimation using di¤erent instrument sets (number of lags) gives similar results.
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Table 2. Estimation Results for Ination Model 1
parameter ination model 1.1 ination model 1.2 ination model 1.3
' 0.566***(0.099) - -
 6.41E-04**(3.37E-04) 1.08E-03**(5.61E-04) 2.91E-03***(6.66E-04)
 -0.464**(0.767) -0.811**(0.382) -1.618***(0.329)
1=(1 + ) 1.852 5.300 -1.617
J 6.949[0.542] 5.291[0.808] 14.302[0.074]
Sample: 01/01/1996-01/11/2007; estimation method: GMM;
*=signicance at 10%;**=signicance at 5%;***=signicance at 1%.
Standard errors of coe¢ cient estimates are in parentheses. P-values for the J-test are in square
brackets.
Table 3. Estimation Results for Exchange Rate Model 2
parameter exchange rate model 2.1 exchange rate model 2.2 exchange rate model 2.3
' 0.591***(0.161) - -
 1.06E-03*(5.74E-04 ) 0.068***(0.024) 6.58E-04***(1.76E-04)
 -0.909***(0.467) -0.017**(8.52E-03) -0.647**(0.833)
1=(1 + ) 10.989 1.017{0.00}a 2.833
J 12.293[0.504] 7.322[0.885] 4.929[0.977]
Sample: 01/01/1996-01/11/2007; estimation method: GMM;
*=signicance at 10%;**=signicance at 5%;***=signicance at 1%.
Standard errors of coe¢ cient estimates are in parentheses. P-values for the J-test are in square
brackets.
a p-values of the equality to unity test are in curly brackets.
Table 4. Estimation Results for Interest Rates Model 3
parameter interest rates model 3.1 interest rates model 3.2 interest rates model 3.3
' 0.800***(0.253) - -
 9.44E-04***(3.26E-04) 1.40E-03***(3.80E-04) 3.68E-03***(8.06E-04)
 -2.49509(2.232) -0.797*(.531) -0.426***(0.329)
1=(1 + ) - 4.926 1.742
J 4.776[0.853] 3.106[0.96] 15.622[0.058]
Sample: 01/01/1996-01/11/2007; estimation method: GMM;
*=signicance at 10%;**=signicance at 5%;***=signicance at 1%.
Standard errors of coe¢ cient estimates are in parentheses. P-values for the J-test are in square
brackets.
In all the models, foreign currency holdings have a positively signicant share ' in
total liquidity services. The parameter estimate is less than one, consistent with the
restrictions. The economic signicance of the US dollar is large. The share estimates
range between 0.57 and 0.8. Thus, more than half of domestic liquidity is provided
by the US dollar. The estimate of the transaction cost reducing role of total money is
reected in parameter . The estimate of this parameter is positively signicant, less
than one, and small in magnitude. The data supports the highly signicant role of total
money services in reducing transaction costs associated with domestic consumption.
The estimates of substitution parameter  are, in general, signicant and of mean-
ingful magnitude. In the rst two versions of the ination model, the parameter esti-
mates imply the elasticity of currency substitution being 1.9 and 5.3. There is strong
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substitution between the US dollar and the lari in Georgia. The implicit demand for
the US dollar is responsive to relative currency price changes. In the case of the ina-
tion model, an increase in domestic over foreign ination leads to the substitution of
the domestic for the foreign currency.
In model 2 with the exchange rate, the implied elasticity of substitution is between
1.017 and 11. The demand for the US dollar is responsive to the uctuations in the
relative currency price. Keeping ' constant in the rst version of the exchange rate
model, the substitution parameter estimate is close to -1. The elasticity of currency
substitution is smaller in the second and third versions of model 2. The hypothesis
1=(1+) = 1 is rejected at any signicance level in favor of 1=(1+) > 1 in the second
version of exchange rate model 2.
In model 3 with interest rates, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign money is 1.74 and 4.9 for the second and the third versions, respectively. The
US dollar holdings are strong substitutes for the lari when money are used to reduce
transaction costs in buying consumption goods and services. However, the substitution
parameter estimate is not signicant in the rst version of the interest rate model 3.
To summarize, monthly Georgian data gives support to the modelsoveridentifying
restrictions. The data supports the money-in-the-utility-function model specication
with the transactions cost-reducing role for money. Total liquidity services provide
signicant cost-reducing services for transactions. Overall, the implied elasticity of
currency substitution is greater than one. The elasticity ranges between 1.017 and 11,
depending on the partial e¤ect model specication and version. The US dollar is a good
substitute for the lari when the motive for holding money is to reduce transaction costs
in purchasing consumption goods. The implicit demand for the US dollar in Georgia
is responsive to the changes in the relative values of the currencies. The estimate of
the share parameter for foreign currency in total money services is signicant. The US
dollar accounts for a more than 50% share of total liquidity.
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2.5 Dynamics of Dollarization
The optimality conditions of the three versions of the three models are used to
calculate the implied domestic to foreign money ratios by the models. The optimal
money ratio in the economy at period t is a function of the economy parameters and
consumption-money ratios. In model 1, the money ratio is also a function of domestic
and foreign ination. In the second and third models, the ratio depends on the changes
in the exchange rate and interest rates, respectively. In two more versions of partial
e¤ect models, the assumption of the xed parameter ' is relaxed. The actual historical
values of the dollarization ratio are compared to the modelsimplied ones. The latter
values are calculated using the estimated parameter values for Georgia. For each partial
e¤ect model, the results of the versions with the dollarization ratio closest to the actual
one are presented.
Figure 3 shows the actual and the calculated from the ination model dollarization
dynamics. For the rst version of the ination model, the optimal money ratios capture
the major movements in the actual data in two-thirds of the sample. Before 1997, the
model implies a lower dollarization ratio. In the rst half of 1997, the dynamics of the
ratios is roughly the same. The models implied dollarization is only slightly lower than
in the actual data during the period 1998-2003. The model implies greater volatility
than in the actual data. The increased volatility according to the ination after 2003
mainly results from a decrease in the domestic consumption-money ratio over time.
The model predicts lower dollarization and even de-dollarization after 2003.
The exchange rate models imply a dollarization ratio that is very close to its actual
values (Figure 4). For the period 1996-1997, model 2.1 underestimates the dollarization
ratio in Georgia as opposed to model 2.3. The exchange rate model with inertia 2.3
performs better during the period 1997- 1999. The agents in the economy accumulate
knowledge through the use of foreign currency in the previous periods. From 1999
on, both models result in dollarization close to the actual. The partial e¤ect model
51














































































































































that accentuates the role of the exchange rate is suitable to rationalize dollarization in
Georgia for the period 1996- 2007.
The interest rate models 3.1-3.3, on average, predict that agents hold equal amounts
of domestic and foreign currencies, which is not the case in the actual data.42 The
modied interest rate models predict the actual values better in the period 1997-1999.
The poor performance of the interest rate models indicates that the interest rate parity
condition is not likely to hold in Georgia.
Dollarization is persistent in Georgia along with recent improvements in macroeco-
nomic fundamentals. According to the conditional dynamic implications of the models,
the simple basic model is able to capture this pattern. Clearly, the main factor that
inuences the decision on foreign currency holdings is the exchange rate. The exchange
rate model implies dollarization very close to the actual. Inertia in the agentsbehav-
42When habit persistance is introduced the predicted dollarization is less volatile in some periods.
The utility function depends on the quasi-di¤erence of consumption ct   ct 1 rather than only on
consumption at period t. Parameter  is the intensity of habit formation between zero and one.
Modest (0.2) and strong (0.6) intensities of habit formation were considered. However, on average,
the models still predict the same level of dollarization.
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ior explains high dollarization in the period from 1997 to 1999. Ination is the second
factor that inuences foreign currency holdings. However, the ination model predicts
that the dollarization ratio should be more volatile as a response to the changes in do-
mestic ination. The interest rate di¤erential between domestic and foreign currency
deposits should provide incentives to signicantly reduce US dollar holdings according
to the interest rate model.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies dollarization in the Georgian economy based on three versions
of the money-in-utility-function model. These partial e¤ect models stress the roles of
ination, the exchange rate and the interest rate. First, the economic and statistical
signicance of dollarization is studied based on the implications of three versions of
the model. The elasticity of substitution between the US dollar and the lari, and their
shares in money services, are estimated using the GMM procedure. The impact of
learning behavior on the elasticity of currency substitution is studied. Secondly, the
paper compares the models implied and actual dynamics of dollarization. This is done
to rationalize the actual dollarization.
The main empirical ndings reveal that dollarization is of rst-order importance
in Georgia. Monthly data supports the role of total liquidity (personal accounts and
demand deposits) to reduce transaction costs in consumption purchases. The US dollar
provides a good substitute for the lari. Overall, the implied elasticity of currency
substitution is signicantly greater than one. When behavioral aspects are introduced,
the demand for the foreign currency becomes less responsive to the uctuations in the
exchange rate due to learning adjustment. Moreover, the US dollar has a signicant
60% share in the total agentsliquidity services.
The empirical results of this paper can be compared with ndings for other countries
based on the implications of similar dynamic models. Bufman and Leiderman (1991)
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get an elasticity of currency substitution for Israel greater than one. The share of
foreign currency in total liquidity is less than 50%. Selcuk (2003) nds that elasticity
in the Czech Republic is 1.72, in Israel 1.78, in Poland 5, in the Slovak Republic 1.28,
and in Turkey 1.4. Foreign balances have a signicant share in liquidity services: in
Turkey 53%, in Poland 50%, in the Czech Republic 42% and in Israel 39%. Fiedman
and Verbetsky (2001) report the elasticity of currency substitution in Russia between
2 and 3, and estimate of a share of the US dollar in liquidity services below 50%.
In a low ination economy like Canada the US dollar is not a good substitute of
domestic currency and, moreover, the share of foreign currency in domestic liquidity
services is very small (Imrohorouglu, 1994). Dollarization plays a signicant role in
transition economies like Russia, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland, and Georgia
but is insignicant in developed economies like Canada. Moreover, the share of the US
dollar in liquidity services is higher in Georgia than in other developing and developed
countries.
The dollarization ratio calculated from the three partial e¤ect models is compared
to the actual ratio. The exchange rate model predicts dollarization closest to the
actual values among the partial e¤ect models. The ination and interest rate models
predict lower and more volatile dollarization than the actual case. According to the
exchange rate and interest rate models, inertia in foreign currency holdings takes place
until 1999. Agents are looking at the previous periods dollarization in the economy
when deciding how much of each currency to hold. Once agents switched to the US
dollar in response to macroeconomic instability, hedging against future uncertainty
took place. Among the macroeconomic indicators, the best predictor of dollarization
in the Georgian economy is the exchange rate.
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Household Currency Substitution: Evidence
from the Czech Republic, Georgia, Croatia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey
Abstract:
This paper studies household currency substitution in the Czech Republic, Georgia,
Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey based on the implications
of three versions of a money-in-utility-function model. These versions accentuate the
roles of the exchange rate, foreign and domestic currency time deposit interest rates,
and domestic and foreign ination. Structural breaks in the data, which are exogenous
from the perspective of the models, are detected and taken into account. The results
suggest that households have stronger preferences towards foreign currency in Croatia,
Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Turkey than in the Czech Republic and
Kazakhstan. The role of foreign currency in domestic liquidity services decreases over
time in Croatia, Georgia, and Turkey. Foreign currency provides a good substitute for
the domestic currency in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey in several sub-samples.
3.1 Introduction
Following important socioeconomic and political transformations, households of-
ten shift part of their money holdings to foreign currencies. This process is known
as household currency substitution (dollarization). This paper aims at rationalizing
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and exploring the signicance of household dollarization in a newly compiled data set,
which traditionally has not been the focus of the dollarization literature.
Seven countries with a history of macroeconomic instability and di¤erent levels of
development are considered. They are the graduated developing economy of the Czech
Republic, and the emerging and developing economies of Croatia, Turkey, Kazakhstan,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.43 The compiled data set allows focusing on house-
hold dollarization separately from rms.44 The Czech Republic aside, economic and
political changes have induced currency substitution in these countries. Recently, the
economic and political environment has gradually become more stable. Nevertheless,
dollarization remains sizable in some of these countries.
In the recent literature, money demand in a multi-currency economy is derived from
the households maximization problem rather than postulated ad hoc. A money-in-
utility-function (MIUF) model is a general approach to formalize the micro-foundations
for the households money demand.45 The parameters of consumer preferences in
the model are usually estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM, Hansen,
1982).46
This paper adds to the literature by providing evidence on household currency
substitution based on the implications of a benchmark MIUF model for the set of
countries. Foreign and domestic currencies facilitate consumption purchases in this
model. Three versions originate from this benchmark model. Aiming at rationalizing
43Classication is according to the International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook Report,
April 2010.
44Due to data constraints, a dollarization measure cannot be constructed for households and rms
separately for many emerging markets (Stix, 2010).
45In general, both a Baumol-Tobin transaction and simple cash-in-advance models can be approx-
imated by the MIUF model (Feenstra, 1986; Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). The MIUF specication
can be also viewed as a derived utility function that includes real balances because agents economize
on time spent in transacting (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1996).
46Bufman and Leiderman (1993) estimate a model for Israel using a non-expected utility model. Im-
rohoroglu (1994) estimates currency substitution between the Canadian and US dollars. Selcuk (1997)
applies the same model to the Turkish case. Friedman and Verbetsky (2001) consider dollarization in
Russia. Mulligan and Nijsse (2001) examine currency substitution in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania. A study on Bolivia can be found in Cuddington, Garcia, and Westbrook (2002). Selcuk
(2003) provides empirical evidence for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Jordan, Poland, and the
Slovak Republic.
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dollarization in each country, these models accentuate the role of the exchange rate,
foreign and domestic currency time deposit interest rates, and domestic and foreign
ination. Domestic liquidity services are provided by foreign and domestic demand
deposits of households. Non-liquid interest-bearing assets are household time deposits.
Two specications of a liquidity function with two currencies are used. These are a
log-linear and a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. In the case of
log-linear liquidity services, the parameter of interest is the share of foreign currency.
The elasticity of the currency substitution parameter is added in the case of CES
technology.
A households optimal choice between foreign and domestic money is derived from
the optimality conditions of three versions of the MIUF model. For each version of
the MIUF model, corresponding information sets of observables are used in the GMM
estimation. The time series properties of variables are explicitly addressed prior to
estimation analysis. A search for the most critical structural break (Vogelsang, 1997)
and a broken trend stationarity test (Perron, 1989) are performed.47 The elasticity
of currency substitution between the domestic and foreign currencies as well as the
preferences toward each currency in domestic money services are then estimated by
GMM.
The results of the paper indicate that dollarization is of signicant importance in
Croatia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkey. There is little currency
substitution in the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan. Overidentifying restrictions are
not rejected for all the countries in the case of log-liner liquidity services. Structural
breaks are detected in most of the macroeconomic series. They are associated with
but do not necessarily coincide with country-specic events. All the detected breaks
are exogenous from the prospective of the specied models. The instability of the
parametersestimates due to the structural breaks are treated by splitting the sample
and by introducing dummy variables. Most of the series are stationary around a
47The focus is on the most decisive structural break and not on other less pronounced shifts in the
series.
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deterministic time trend with an exogenous change.
The GMM estimation results, before and after structural breaks, demonstrate clear
di¤erences in the economic signicance of the foreign currency in liquidity services.
Overall, the share of the foreign currency in domestic liquidity services is signicantly
positive. In the cases of Croatia, Georgia, and Turkey, the estimated share of foreign
currency in liquidity services is lower after a structural break. For the Czech Republic,
the sample is not divided, as a structural break is at the beginning of the sample. In the
rest of the countries, the estimated share increases. The highest economic signicance
of a foreign currency is in Croatia (0.91-0.93) during the period 1995-2010. The lowest
estimated share, 0.1, is for Kazakhstan in the period 1998-2001 and for the Czech
Republic in the period 1997-2010. The estimated elasticity of currency substitution
in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey is signicantly larger than unity in several sub-
samples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
currency substitution. Section 3 describes the methodology employed and describes
the data used in the analysis to estimate the utility preference parameters. Section
4 presents and discusses empirical results. Section 5 summarizes the results of the
analysis.
3.2 Model of Currency Substitution
The optimal allocation of domestic and foreign currencies is derived from a house-
hold optimization problem in a model with domestic and foreign money in a utility
function. The inclusion of money in the utility function reects the usefulness of both
currencies in reducing transaction costs.
A small endowment economy consists of innitely living identical agents. At the
beginning of each period, each agent decides how much to consume ct = CtNPt ; how















Pt is the price of the consumption good in terms of the domestic currency, P t is the
foreign price, N is the population, which is constant.
The utility function is a reduced form of a more complex problem in which house-
holds can shop more e¢ ciently and increase leisure time by holding more money. The



























The rst order conditions for the problem are


















The term Ux(t) denotes the marginal utility of x at time t. Marginal utilities
Um(t) and Um(t) show a transaction cost reducing role of the real money balances
at period t in domestic and foreign currencies, respectively. In (3.23) and (3.24), the
marginal utility of holding one unit of real money balances plus the discounted next
period marginal utility a¤orded by the real balances at time t are balanced by the
marginal utility loss at time t.
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Substituting (3.25) into (3.26), the optimal allocation of domestic and foreign cur-










To parameterize the model, functional forms are chosen for the utility function
and its money balance components. The utility function follows Kydland and Prescott








This function is a constant relative risk aversion in the consumption and money
services function. Domestic money or liquidity services are produced using a combi-
nation of domestic and foreign currencies. The parameter  > 0 is the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion, and
1

is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution;  reects the
transaction requirement of money in a broad sense. This form of the utility function
reects the motive for holding money: to reduce transaction costs in implementing ef-
cient consumption plans. It highlights the link between liquidity services and e¢ cient
consumption.
Domestic money services 	t is a function of domestic mt and foreign mt currencies.
The liquidity services are well described by a production function. In the applied





t ) = 

(1  ')m t + '(mt ) 
 
 :
In this specication, ' is the distribution parameter,  is a level parameter that
depends on the units in which the output and inputs are measured, and  is the
substitution parameter, which lies between  1 and 1. The parameter  represents
the degree of homogeneity: if  = 1, the function is linear homogeneous. For  =




In this paper, two versions - cases a and b - of the model that di¤er in the liquidity
services functional form are specied. In the rst case, the liquidity service function is
assumed to be additive in domestic and foreign money balances. In the second case,
domestic money services are "produced" according to a CES production function with
both currencies as inputs.
Case a
The optimal allocation of money holdings is derived from a model with log-




t ) = (1  ') lnmt + ' lnmt :
This total liquidity is used by households to reduce transaction costs when purchasing
consumption goods. The utility preference parameter ' 2 (0; 1) is the share of foreign
currency in domestic liquidity services. The value and statistical signicance of this
parameter show how big are householdss preferences for domestic and foreign curren-
cies in total liquidity. This parameter shows how big and signicant the evidence of
currency substitution is in an economy.
Using the purchasing power parity condition, the rst order conditions, and the
48With ! 0, this is the case of the unit elasticity of substitution  = 1; and the production function
is a linear homogeneous Cobb-Douglas function. If  ! 1, there is no substitution  = 0; and it
is a Leontief production function. Finally, when  !  1 and the elasticity of currency substitution
!1 the inputs are perfect substitutes and the production function is additive.
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uncovered interest rate parity condition



















Specication (3.30) will be referred to as M1a: case a of exchange rate model 1.












Specication (3.31) will be referred to as M2a: case a of interest rate model 2.
Using denition of ination













(1 + it+1)(t+1 + 1)  t+1   1
: (3.32)
Specication (3.32) will be referred to as M3a: case a of ination model 3.
Case b





(1  ')m t + '(mt ) 
  1
 :
This total liquidity is used by households to reduce transaction costs when purchas-
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and the share of foreign currency in domestic liquidity
services ' 2 (0; 1). The utility preference parameter ' 2 (0; 1) is the share of foreign
currency in domestic liquidity services. The value and statistical signicance of this
parameter show how big are householdspreferences to domestic and foreign currencies
in total liquidity. The value and signicance of the substitution parameter  show how
responsive demand for foreign currency is to changes in its relative price in terms of
exchange rate, ination, and interest rates. These two parameters show the evidence
of currency substitution in an economy in terms of both householdspreferences for
foreign currency use for transactions, and the elasticity of substitution between the
two currencies.
Using (3.27), the case b for the exchange rate model, the ination model, and the






































3.3 Data, Tests, and Estimation Procedure
3.3.1 Data
The gure below shows the evolution of the share of foreign currency demand
deposits in total demand deposits of households in the set of countries considered in
this paper. The Czech Republic is a country that went through political and economic
transformations. Unlike other countries in the sample, it does not demonstrate a high
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level of currency substitution. It is therefore used as a comparison and convergence
benchmark.
































































































































Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are former members of the So-
viet Union. These economies went through severe political and economic changes
after the collapse of the USSR. The instability induced by these changes created an
environment for currency substitution. These countries are heavily dependent on re-
mittances.49 Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan belong to seven poorest countries of
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the CIS-7 group.
Turkey experienced political and economic changes between 1980 and 2000. These
changes and crises in governance caused the high level of dollarization the country still
experiences today. Croatia also experienced important economic and political changes
building itself from the former Yugoslavia. These changes and the general instability of
the region for many years led to a high level of currency substitution in this economy.
In Table 1, the data series summary statistics are presented. All the data series
are at monthly frequencies. The longest available sample periods are di¤erent for
49Tajikistan ranks rst in the world in terms of the dependency of its economy on remittances: 52
percent of GDP in 2008 (IMF Country Report No. 10/104, 2010).
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each country. Several variables are constructed for each country. Depending on the
country, the foreign currency is either USD or Euro. The ratio of foreign to domestic
money holdings by households
mt
mt
is built from householdspersonal accounts from
which deposited funds can be withdrawn at any time without any notice or penalty.
This is a measure of foreign and local currencies used by resident households every
month to facilitate transaction costs.50 The data series it (for domestic currency) and
it (for foreign currency) are nominal interest rates on householdsdeposits in banking
institutions that cannot be withdrawn for a certain period of time.51 These data series




is constructed from the nominal exchange rate in units of domestic currency per one
unit of foreign currency taken from the International Financial Statistics database.
Domestic, Euro area, and US inations (t ,eurot and 
us
t ) are month-to-month
changes of CPI obtained from the IFS, the central banks, and the statistical o¢ ces.
3.3.2 Testing and Estimation
In order to estimate the parameters ' and  in the models M1a, M2a, M3a and
M1b, M2b, M3b, the GMM method is used. The GMM estimates of parameters are
consistent only when data is a stationary process. Stationarity is important for the
sample means to converge as the sample size increases. Existing structural breaks in
the data should not be neglected. In this paper, prior to the estimation, the data
series are analyzed focusing on structural break and stationarity issues. A detailed
description of all the tests and the estimation procedure is provided in Appendix I.
The Vogelsang (1997) test is applied to search for a break point in the time series.
The null hypothesis of no break is tested. A trimming parameter is specied for each
time series. It represents the portion of the time span that is not allowed to contain
50Adding foreign and domestic currency cash would be an even more accurate measure of liquid
money. Unfortunately, no data on foreign cash in circulation is avaliable for every country. In the
literature, demand deposits are used very often for estimation purposes.
51The interest rate di¤erential (it it) was also used instead of it : All the estimation results remained
roughly the same.
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a break. For time series without a structural break detected, the usual stationarity
tests are performed. These are Phillips and Perron (1988), (augmented) Dickey-Fuller
(1981), and (augmented) Weighted Symmetric tests.
The break detected by the Vogelsang test is used as the expected break in the Perron
(1989) test for broken trend stationarity. The null hypothesis is that a series has a unit
root with an exogenous structural break that occurs at a given date. The alternative
hypothesis is stationarity around a deterministic time trend with an exogenous change.
Three alternative specications are considered that allow for an exogenous change in
the intercept, an exogenous change in the linear trend coe¢ cient, and a combination
of an exogenous change in intercept and the linear trend coe¢ cient.
Structural breaks determined by the above tests are exogenous from the perspective
of the economic models. To assure the stability of the GMM estimated parameters and
to bring more exibility to the estimation, the breaks are treated as follows. When
the money ratio in (3.30), (3.31), (3.32) and (3.34), (3.33), (3.35) is a broken trend
stationary time series, the sample for the GMM estimation is divided according to
the break point. Within each sub-sample the data series is now stationary around the
deterministic time trend. The trend is explicitly included in the regression.52 Structural
breaks in other series are captured by structural break dummy variables.
The GMM methodology is used within each sub-sample to estimate the parame-
ters ' and . The GMM procedure is robust to conditional heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. Two lags of each independent variable and a constant are used as
instrumental variables. Alternative instrument sets are used to check the sensitivity of
results to the choice of instruments. A J-test is used to test the null hypothesis that
the moment conditions hold (the overidentifying restrictions hold). This test provides
a convenient method for testing the validity of the model specication.
52If no trend is included in the regression, then the right-hand-side variable is likely to be signicant




Results of the search for a structural break and of tests for (trend) stationarity are
presented in this subsection. The time series used in the estimation are tested. They
are households foreign to domestic demand deposit ratio
mt
mt
, interest rates on foreign
and local currency time deposits it and it , depreciation rate zt, domestic ination t;
and external inations eurot and 
us
t :
Table 2 presents the results of the Vogelsang test for a structural break, the Perron
test for broken trend stationarity, and the Phillips and Perron (1988), the (augmented)
Dickey-Fuller (1981), and the (augmented) Weighted Symmetric tests for series without
a structural break.
For the Vogelsang test, the determined structural break date at a 5% signicance
level is presented together with a trimming parameter . This result is obtained
by testing the null hypothesis of no break versus the alternative of a single break.
Critical values tabulated in Vogelsang (1997) are used. The order of a trend polynomial
(p=0,1,2) is chosen based on a combination of visual inspection and the Ben-David and
Papell algorithm.53 The number of lags of the dependent variable (to account for serial
correlation in errors) is determined by the Campbell-Perron method.
To summarize the results, the Vogelsang test detected structural breaks in most
of the time series. Many breaks are associated with the socioeconomic and political
transformations of the 1990s and the global nancial crisis that started in summer
2007. Others are country-specic events.




) is detected in June 1997. It was caused by the rehabilitation of banks, injection
53Start with p=2 (quadratic trend). If the null hypothesis of no trend break can be rejected the
result is reported. In the opposite case, set p = 1 (linear trend). The null hypothesis is tested again.
If the null can be rejected then the results are reported. Otherwise, the model with p = 0 (no trend),
is estimated and the result is reported.
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of cash in the banking system through privatization, and the introduction of insurance
on a households deposit. The January 2008 break in the depreciation rate (zt) was
due to central bank intervention. This intervention led to a decline in the domestic
currencys (the kuna) liquidity, strengthening the appreciation pressures. The October
2008 break in the interest rate on the kunas time deposits (it) is due to the central bank
policies to stop the withdrawal of deposits from domestic banks. The November 1996
break in the interest rate on foreign currency time deposits (it ) can be explained by the
risky behavior of banks in 1996 that provided time deposits (in DEM) with rates that
exceeded substantially comparable rates in Germany (Kraft and Galac, 2007). Finally,
the ination break (t) in August 2007 was caused by supply side shocks, especially
by the increase in food prices.
For the Czech Republic, the November 1997 break in
mt
mt
was mainly caused by the
central banks institutional reforms. The March 2009 break in zt was caused by the
increased depreciation that resulted from a contraction of exports. The March 1999 it
break resulted from a gradual decline in money market rates. Finally, the December
2002 t break was caused by various factors a¤ecting both supply and demand.
In Georgia, the March 2003 break in
mt
mt
was mostly due to the strengthening of
household condence in the domestic currency. The February 1999 break in zt was a
result of the Russian crisis in 1998. Finally, the June 1997 and March 1998 breaks in it
and it , respectively, were both due to an increase in time deposit dollarization in these
periods.
For Kazakhstan, the August 2001 break in
mt
mt
reected the capital amnesty that
was o¤ered to legalize funds. This caused deposit dollarization to rise sharply as these
funds were deposited in US dollars. Since then, dollarization has been decreasing. In
1999, Junes zt and Augusts t breaks were caused by the Russian crisis. In 2009,
Februarys it and Septembers it breaks were mostly induced by an increase of the
deposit volume despite the crisis.
In Kyrgyzstan, the February 2004 break in
mt
mt
is a preamble to a gradual partial
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de-dollarization. December 1996s zt break marks the end of an exchange rate sharp
drop in 1996. The reasons were external assistance to build international reserves and
an increase in money growth rates. Both Marchs it and Aprils it breaks in 1999 are
linked with the banking crisis of 1998-1999. Finally, the July 1999s t break is related
to a decline in economic activity, the inadequacy of supervision, and large depreciation
following the Russian crisis in 1998.
Tajikistans September 2004 break in
mt
mt
marks an increased growth of dollariza-
tion in the economy. July 2009s zt break is caused by the somonis (the local currency)
increased depreciation against the US Dollar. The central bank maintained a conven-
tional peg exchange rate arrangement. In 2009, the central bank committed to a more
exible exchange rate regime (managed oat). This policy was aimed at managing
the external current account decit and to support an adjustment to external shocks.
Finally, February 2003s t break is a preamble of the e¤ects of the central banks
successful policy of stabilizing the reserve money growth to reduce ination.
In Turkey, the February 2003 break in
mt
mt
marks a reversed trend: the decrease of
foreign exchange deposits. The reason is that the lira (the Turkish currency) appreci-
ated against the US Dollar in this period mostly due to strong economic development
in the country. June 1994s zt break was due to a currency crisis in Turkey. In the
course of the crisis, the lira depeciated by almost 60%, and the economy recorded a
negative growth of 6%. The central bank lost $3 billion of its international reserves,
and three banks collapsed.54 Both March 2001s it and June 2001s it breaks are due to
a period of depreciation of the lira toward the US Dollar, severe political and economic
instability that led to the collapse of exchange rate system, and an eventual change
to oating regime. March 1991s t break marks one of the peaks in the period of
54The central governments moves in 1992 and 1993 to grant large salary increases to civil servants
and to increase transfers to state enterprises enlarged the public-sector borrowing requirement to
a record 17 percent of GDP in 1993. These high government spendings sharply boosted domestic
demands rate of growth to 6.4 percent in 1992 and 7.6 percent in 1993. In turn, ination rates went
up, with the annual rate peaking at 73 percent in mid-1993. This resulted in a rise in the real exchange
rate, translated into increased imports, and slowed the expansion of exports. The trade decit rose
in 1993 to $14 billion, while the current account decit reached $6.3 billion, or 5.3 percent of GDP.
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sustainability of high and persistent ination. Only since the end of March 2004 has
the government succeeded in lowering ination to single-digit levels.
The global economic downturn in the second half of 2008 had rapidly pushed down
commodity prices. Thus, in the Euro zone and the USA, ination breaks in eurot and
ust indicate disination that happened after previously high ination peaks.
When a break is not detected, Phillips and Perron (1988), (augmented) Dickey-
Fuller (1981), and (augmented) Weighted Symmetric tests are performed. In Table
2, p-values of the tests are presented for the most suitable model (trend, constant,
augmented, etc.). The ination in Georgia and the interest rates in Tajikistan are
stationary according the tests results.
For the Perron test, the break detected by the Vogelsang test is used as the expected
break. The test statistics for testing the null hypothesis  = 1, the signicance level
in its rejection, and the estimated pre-break fraction  are reported in Table 2. The
model specication is selected according to the signicance of other coe¢ cients in the
hypothesis. The results of the test show that all the series containing a break (in level,
trend, or both) are broken trend stationary, i.e. stationary around a deterministic time
trend with an exogenous change in the trend function at the break time.
All the breaks are exogenous from the perspective of the economic models specied
in Section 2. Estimated parameters in M1a, M2a, M3a, M1b, M2b, and M3b, but not
the specication of the process itself, are likely to change due to the detected breaks in
data. Thus, the estimation is done over sub-samples without major breaks in the ratio
of foreign to domestic household demand deposits. Structural break dummy variables
are included to capture the breaks in the depreciation rate, interest rate, and ination.
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3.4.2 GMM Estimation
The GMM is applied as the method of moments estimation on a set of orthogo-
nality conditions being the products of equations and instruments.55 Initial conditions
for estimation are obtained by three-stage least squares. The estimation allows for po-
tential heteroscedasticity and cross-equation correlation. The instrumental variables
are two lags of the independent variables. The GMM model selection criteria are
the J-statistic for testing over-identifying restrictions, goodness of t, and coe¢ cient
signicance.
In order to account for detected breaks in the money ratio
mt
mt
; the sample is divided
according to the break point. Structural breaks in other series are captured by adding
a structural break dummy variable dBt. This dummy variable captures a break in
level, intercept, or level and intercept depending on the series. A trend polynomial is
added to the equations as most of the series are broken trend stationarity.
For each model, the equations below are estimated over the sub-samples where
mt
mt

















































p + b  dBt + t: (3.38)
The rst set of models consists of M1a, M2a, and M3a, the case of additive liquidity
55The advantages of GMM over IV are the following. If heteroskedasticity is present, the GMM
estimator is more e¢ cient than the simple IV estimator. If heteroscedasticity is not present, the GMM
estimator is no worse asymptotically than the IV estimator.
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service function ( ! 0): In this case, the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign currencies is unity. The estimated parameter ' shows a households pref-
erences to use the local currency in their total liquidity. Models M1b, M2b, and M3b
contain both parameters ' and .
The GMM estimation results for models M1a, M2a, and M3a are reported in Ta-
ble 3. Overall, the modelsoveridentifying restrictions cannot be rejected at standard
signicance levels.




. The highly signicant estimate of the share of foreign currency in liq-
uidity services changes from 0.93 to 0.92 after the break. The economic and statistical
signicance of dollarization in the country is very high. The trend signicance and di-
rection are in line with the dynamics of dollarization. The breaks in the right-hand-side
variables, it and eurot ; are signicant in M2a and M3a.




. Model one is estimated with p=2 (quadratic trend). A structural break
dummy variable for July 2009 in zt is included. The estimate of the share of foreign
currency in domestic liquidity services is highly signicant. However, it is small in
magnitude being 0.22. This indicates a signicantly positive role of foreign currency
in total liquidity services. The economic signicance is, however, small given its mag-
nitude. The structural break dummy is positively signicant, and is very small in
magnitude. In the model with ination (M3a), the estimate of the share of foreign cur-
rency in domestic liquidity services indicates only 0.13 of economic signicance. The
linear trend is signicant only at the 10% level, and the quadratic trend is negative
and highly signicant.
In Georgia, the economic signicance of dollarization changes from 0.87 before
2004 to 0.44 after in the model with exchange rate. The linear trend is signicant
and has the expected sign. The structural break dummy in the depreciation rate is
signicantly positive. In model 2 with interest rates, both samples indicate a 0.62 share
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of foreign currency in domestic liquidity services. Both the linear and quadratic trend
are signicant. The structural break dummy for the interest rate is insignicant. In
model 3 with ination, the estimated share is lower. It is 0.36 in the rst sub-sample
and decreases to 0.27 after 2004. A negatively signicant quadratic trend is present
only in the second sub-sample.
The estimate of the share of foreign currency is only 0.1 - 0.2 in Kazakhstan before
the structural break in 2001. In the second sub-sample, the estimated share increases
to 0.46 in the rst two models and to 0.48 in the third one. An upward trend in the
rst sub-sample is reected in a positively signicant quadratic trend in models 1 and
2, and in a positively signicant linear trend in model 2. The structural break dummy
variables are signicant in all the models (only at the 10% level in the rst model).
In the Kyrgyz Republic, for the rst sub-sample prior to 2004, the estimate of the
share of foreign currency is 0.30 for model 1, 0.42 for model 2, and 0.44 for model 3.
An upward dollarization trend is reected in a positively signicant linear trend. In
the second sub-sample, the estimates of the share are 0.76 in the rst two models and
0.74 in the third one. The linear trend is signicantly negative. Dummy variables for
breaks in RHS are signicant in all the models.
In Tajikistan, the estimated shares over the rst sub-sample are 0.49, 0.50, and
0.48 in models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The linear trend coe¢ cients are signicantly
positive with small magnitude. In the second sub-sample, the estimate of the share of
foreign currency is signicantly higher, 0.91, 0.79, and 0.64 in the models 1, 2, and 3.
The upward trend is larger in magnitude and the quadratic trend becomes signicant.
The dummy variable is signicant only in the third model. In the rst model, the break
resulted in non-stationary coe¢ cients, and the results excluding the break are reported.
The right-hand-side ratio it+1
(it+1 zt+1) is a stationary process without a structural break.
The estimated share parameter for Turkey over the rst sub-sample is 0.93 for model
1, 0.81 for model 2, and 0.91 for model 3. The linear trend is positively signicant and
the quadratic trend is negative and very small in magnitude. In the second sub-sample,
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the estimated share is a bit lower: 0.86, 0.82, and 0.85. The linear trend is signicantly
negative indicating decreasing dollarization in the economy. The dummy variable for
structural break is signicant only in the third model.
For each country, the estimation results for the models with two parameters ' and 
are reported in Table 4. The starting values supplied for the parameters are ! 0 and
b'; the estimated coe¢ cient from the model with unit elasticity of substitution. Starting
guesses were obtained in the same way as for the previous models. One hundred other
initial starting values were used to check the robustness of the parameter estimates.
Several models have convergence problems with most starting values. The results of
these models are not robust and stable. Their results are not reported but marked as
NC (not converged).
The specications of the models, the order of the trend, the right-hand-side break
dummy variables, and instrumental variables are exactly the same as in M1a, M2a, and
M3a. The models are estimated over the same sub-samples. The coe¢ cients of the
trend and dummies for break variables are roughly the same in magnitude and sign.
The models overidentifying restriction cannot be rejected in all the models with three
exceptions. These are M2b in the rst sub-sample for Georgia, and M1b and M2b in
the second sub-sample for Tajikistan.
For Croatia, the estimated share of foreign currency is in the same range as in M1a,
M2a, and M3a. The coe¢ cient is signicant in three cases: both sub-samples for M2b,
and in M3b over the rst sub-sample. The economic signicance of currency substitu-
tion is again very high: 0.94 and 0.98. The estimated coe¢ cient  is insignicant in
all the models.
For the Czech Republic, the estimates of the coe¢ cients  and ' are both insignif-
icant at all signicance levels in model M1b. The signs and magnitudes of the trend
and break coe¢ cients are the same as in model M1a.
The estimated shares of foreign currency in Georgia usually have similar magnitude
as in the rst set of models in all the models. The exception is M2b over the rst sub-
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sample (moreover, this models specication is rejected according to the J-test). Both
estimated coe¢ cients  and ' are signicant in M1b and M2b over the second sub-




equal to 19.2, 4.065, and 3.096. Hence, the results suggest that the US dollar is a strong
substitute for the lari when the motive for holding money is to reduce transaction costs.
The highest elasticity of substitution is in model 1, suggesting that the demand for
the US dollar is more responsive to the uctuations in the exchange rate than to the
changes in the interest rate on time deposits or ination. The economic signicance
of currency substitution is more than 0.5 in the rst two models and only 0.26 in the
third one.
For Kazakhstan, the estimated share parameter of the foreign currency is highly
signicant in the second and third models over the second sub-samples. The economic
signicance of the currency substitution is moderate at 0.46 and 0.48. The models
indicate that the implied elasticity of the currency substitution is not signicant or
less than unity (0.56) in the model with ination.
The estimation results for the Kyrgyz Republic indicate that the economic signif-
icance of currency substitution is roughly that same as in the rst set of models. It
changes from 0.43 and 0.48 in the period 1996-2004 to 0.6 and 0.9 in the period 2004-
2010. In the second model, the elasticity of currency substitution falls from 6.9 in the
rst sub-sample to 2.6 in the second. In model three, the elasticity is insignicant in
the rst sub-sample, and is 0.7 in the second. In the models with exchange rate, both
coe¢ cients are insignicant.
For Tajikistan, the estimated coe¢ cients  and ' are not signicant in any of the
models Moreover, the overidentifying restrictions are rejected in two cases. These




The results from the Turkish data indicate that in the second model the economic
signicance of dollarization changes from 0.45 to 0.91 between the sub-samples. The
elasticity of currency substitution is very high in the rst sub-sample but is insignicant
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in the second. In model 3, the estimated share of the foreign currency parameter is
0.65, and the elasticity is 2.1.
To summarize, foreign currency plays a signicant role in the total liquidity that is
used to reduce transaction costs in purchasing goods in each country. The estimated
magnitude of the preferences di¤er with the countries and sub-samples. The highest
estimated preferences, 0.93, are in Croatia for the period 1995-1997. This parameter
drops to 0.91 after 1997, and the money ratio has a signicant negative trend. In
the Czech Republic, the preferences for foreign currency are low, 0.1 and 0.2. The
substitution parameters are insignicant in both Croatia and the Czech Republic.
In Georgia and Turkey, the values of the estimated share parameters are big. Ac-
cording to the interest rate model, the estimated parameters are the same before and
after the break in both countries. Other models suggest that the estimated preference
parameter drops signicantly after 2003 in Turkey, and after 2004 in Georgia. The
money ratio, in general, has a signicant negative trend after the break. The implied
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign currencies is very signicant and
high in Georgia after 2004 in the exchange rate and interest rate models, and before
2004 in the ination model. In Turkey, the implied elasticity is larger than unity for
the period 1990-2003 in the second and third models.
The estimated preference share increases after 2001 in Kazakhstan (from 0.1 to
0.4), and after 2004 in the Kyrgyz Republic (from 0.4 to 0.7) and in Tajikistan (from
0.5 to 0.8). In Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, the money ratio has a negatively
signicant trend during these periods. In contrast, this trend is signicantly positive
in Tajikistan. In Kazakhstan, the implied elasticity of substitution is less than unity
in the third model during the period 2001-2010. According to the second model, the
demand for foreign currency is responsive to changes in the relative prices of curren-
cies in the Kyrgyz Republic. During the period 2004-2010, the elasticity is less than




This paper rationalizes and studies the signicance of household dollarization. A
newly compiled data set is used to explore the signicance of dollarization based on
three versions of a money-in-utility-function (MIUF) models implications. The data
set includes countries with a history of important economic and political transforma-
tions: the Czech Republic, Croatia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on household cur-
rency substitution based on the micro-foundations of the individuals demand for
money in the set of countries. Three versions of a MIUF model are specied to ratio-
nalize household dollarization. The models focus on the observables that individuals
typically base their decision to hold foreign currency on: exchange rate, foreign and
domestic time deposit interest rates, and ination at home and abroad. Structural
breaks in the data that are exogenous from the perspective of the models are detected
and added to the estimation. The main nding is that currency substitution is most
signicant in Croatia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Turkey, while it
is not signicant in the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan.
The model is specied with foreign and domestic money in the utility function,
reecting the usefulness of both currencies to reduce transaction costs. Dollarization is
empirically analyzed using observable money holdings that represent a store of value:
household deposits. The liquidity services are provided by the households foreign and
domestic demand deposits. Non-liquid interest-bearing assets are the households time
deposits.
A households optimal choice between foreign and domestic money is derived from
the optimality conditions of the three versions of the MIUF model. Two cases are
considered for each model: log-linear and the CES technologies to produce liquidity
services. In the case of log-linear liquidity services, the parameter of interest is the share
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of foreign currency in money services. The magnitude of this parameter measures the
economic signicance of dollarization in an economy. The elasticity of the currency
substitution parameter is added in the case of the CES technology. It shows the
responsiveness of the demand for foreign currency to uctuations in the exchange rate,
domestic and foreign ination, and interest rates in domestic and foreign currency
deposits.
An endogenous search for critical structural breaks in the data is performed prior
to the GMM estimation. Structural breaks, detected in most of the series, are often
associated with country-specic events that are exogenous for specied MIUF models.
The estimation sample is divided according to the break in the ratio of foreign to
domestic demand deposits. This corrects for the instability of parameter estimates due
to the structural breaks in the data. Breaks in independent variables are captured by
structural break dummies. The trend is included into the estimation as most series are
stationary around a deterministic trend. The conditions for the optimal choice between
foreign and domestic money are estimated using the GMM method. The instrumental
variables are two lags of the independent variables in each version of the model. In
general, the data gives support to modelsoveridentifying restrictions.
Overall, the estimation results show that the share of foreign currency in total
domestic liquidity services is positively signicant in each country. The economic sig-
nicance of dollarization is di¤erent in sub-samples before and after detected structural
breaks. It decreased over time in Croatia, Georgia, and Turkey, and increased in Tajik-
istan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The share of foreign currency in total liquidity is
economically small in the Czech Republic (0.1-0.22) and in Kazakhstan (0.15-0.48).
The share of foreign currency in domestic liquidity is the highest in Croatia ranging
from 0.91 to 0.93. In general, foreign currency accounts for more than half of total
domestic liquidity in Georgia, Tajikistan, and Turkey. The minimum and maximum
estimates of the share are 0.3 and 0.9 for Georgia, 0.48 and 0.91 for Tajikistan, and
0.6 and 0.93 for Turkey. When the CES functional form is used, the magnitude of the
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estimate of the share of foreign currency in liquidity services is roughly similar for all
countries. According to the implied elasticity of currency substitution, the US dollar
is a strong substitute for the local currency in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. In
Kazakhstan, it is less than one in the ination model.
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Appendix I: Methodology
Vogelsang and Perron Tests
The test proposed by Vogelsang (1997) endogenously searches for a single break point
in a series. The specication of this test is robust to the unit-root dynamics of the
series, does not impose restrictions on the nature of the data and the distribution of
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errors, and can be applied to a general polynomial function of time. The null hypothesis
of no break is tested for a data generating process. To perform the Vogelsang test for
a time series fytgTt=1, a re-parametrisation for the data generating process is used and
then the following equation is estimated by the OLS:








i + yt 1 +
KX
t=1
iyt i + "t: (3.39)
The dummy variables for the structural break are: DUt = 1 for t > TCB and zero
otherwise, and DTt = t   TCB for t > TCB and zero otherwise with TCB being the
unknown time of the break. This specication allows for a shift in level and trend at
the break point. The serial correlation in errors is addressed by including lags of a
dependent variable. The appropriate number of lags is usually determined using the
method proposed by Campbell and Perron (1991): by setting the upper bound to eight
and reducing it until the estimate of the coe¢ cient at the highest lag is signicant at
the 10% level.
The OLS estimation of 3.39 is done for all possible break dates TCB = T;  2
[; 1   ], where  is a trimming parameter that represents the portion of the time
span that is not allowed to contain a break, and T is the number of observations. There
are two possible values of the parameter : 0.01 and 0.15. The parameters choice
depends on the expectations of where the break appears. If the break is likely to appear
in the beginning or at the end of the sample, the trimming parameter is set to 0.01.
In the case of a break in the middle,  = 0:15. For each of the estimated equations
that di¤er in the potential break date, the hypothesis i = 0 is tested computing the
usual F-test. Finally, the statistic SupF is calculated as the maximum over all F-
statistics. The null hypothesis of no break is rejected if this statistic is greater than
the appropriate critical value in absolute value.
The break detected by the Vogelsang test is used as the expected break in the
Perron test for broken trend stationarity. The test considers three alternative speci-
87
cations: exogenous change in the intercept (A), exogenous change in the linear trend
coe¢ cient (B), and a combination of an exogenous change in intercept and the linear
trend coe¢ cient (C).
ModelA : yt = + t+ d(DTB)t + DUt + yt 1 +
KX
t=1
iyt i + "t; (3.40)
ModelB : yt = + t+ (DT )t + yt 1 +
KX
t=1
iyt i + "t; (3.41)




In these specications, TB is the predetermined break date. The dummies are
D(TB)t   1 for t = TB + 1 and zero otherwise, DUt   1 for t > TB and zero otherwise,
and DTt = t  TB for t > TB and zero otherwise.
Perrons null hypothesis is that a series has a unit root with an exogenous structural
break that occurs at a given date. The alternative hypothesis is stationarity around
deterministic time trend with an exogenous change. The series are broken trend sta-
tionary only if the remaining coe¢ cients satisfy all the requirements on other coe¢ cient
estimates for the general specication of the alternative hypothesis.
ModelA : H0 :  = 1;  = 0;  = 0; d 6= 0;HA :  < 1;  6= 0;  6= 0; d = 0; (3.43)
ModelB : H0 :  = 1;  = 0;  = 0;HA :  < 1;  6= 0;  6= 0; (3.44)
ModelC : H0 :  = 1;  = 0;  = 0;  6= 0; d 6= 0;HA :  < 1;  6= 0;  6= 0;  6= 0; d = 0:(3.45)
The test critical values di¤er with the pre-break fraction  = TB=T . This fraction
accounts for the break timing with respect to the whole time span. If the calculated
t-statistic is lower than the appropriate critical value, the H0 of UR with a break is
rejected in favor of broken trend stationarity.
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Generalized Method of Moments
As the name suggests, GMM estimates the unknown parameters by the method of mo-
ments (MOM). Moreover, it allows for more orthogonality conditions than parameters.
Provided the data is a stationary and ergodic process, the GMM estimates are typi-
cally consistent and normally distributed, even if the series in the moment conditions
are serially correlated and heteroskedastic. Most traditional methods (OLS, IV, MLE,
etc.) are special cases of GMM.
Formally, denote a stationary and ergodic data vector (h 1) by zt; and a (Th 1)
vector [z1:::zT ] by ZT . Let  be a (a  1) vector of coe¢ cients with the true value
0. The residual from the model is a (r  1) vector-valued function h(zt; ). The
orthogonality (moment) conditions are
E(h(zt; 0)) = 0:







If the system is exactly identied (the number of equations is equal to the number
of unknown parameters, a = r), g(; Zt) can be set equal to zero by solving for the
parameters in . When the system is overidentied (a < r), the parameters can
no longer be solved for by inverting the functions. Instead, a criterion function of
the moment equations is minimized. To derive the GMM estimator of ; the sample
moment g(; Zt) is put as close as possible to the population moment of zero. The
GMM estimator minimizes the quadratic form of a weighted criterion function with
positive denite weighting matrices WT :
minfg(; Zt)
0 WT  g(; Zt)g:
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The a rst order conditions for minimizing the GMM loss function with respect to







0 W  g(b; Zt) = 0:
The inverse of the covariance matrix of the moment conditions S0 evaluated at the












If the vector process h(zt; ) is serially uncorrelated, then the matrix S0 can be heteroskedasiticity-






. This estimator can be modied
to take into account serial correlation by using the Newey-West estimator.
When the system is overidentied (a < r), the statistic JT = Tg(b; Zt)0  S 10 
g(b; Zt) can be shown to be asymptotically 2-distributed with (r  a) degrees of free-
dom when WT = S 10 is used. This is a test for overidentifying restrictions (J-test).
This test provides a convenient method for testing the validity of the model specica-
tion. If the test statistic is signicant, the model specication under consideration can
be rejected.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Decision BS BS BS N/A BS
Georgia
DF         0.00
PP         0.00








































































Decision BS BS BS BS S
Tajikistan
DF     0.01 0.01  
PP     0.00 0.00  















    t =  7:04

 = 0:14










































Vogelsang test: H0: no break; HA : a break in at least one of the trend polynom ials or in the intercept; 
 is a trimm ing
param eter;TCB is the estim ated break tim e; order of trend polynom ial p=0,1,2 ; K is determ ined by the Campbell-Perron method; 5%
critica l values are used (source: Vogelsang, 1997). Perron test: H0: un it ro ot w ith exogenous break in trend and/or intercept, HA : broken
trend stationarity ; K is determ ined by the Campbell-Perron method; predeterm ined break date is TCB ;  is the pre-break fraction ; critica l
values source: Perron (1989). For Weighted Symmetric (W S,tau) , D ickey-Fuller (DF,tau), Phillips-Perron (PP,z) tests p-values are for
optim al number of lags.
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Table 3. GMM Estim ation Resu lts: Case a
Model M 1a M2a M3a
Croatia
Smpl 1995:7 - 1997:06 1997:06 - 2009:12 1995:7 - 1997:06 1997:06 - 2009:12 1995:7 - 1997:06 1997:06 - 2009:12
' 0.93*** 0.917*** 0.93*** 0.91*** 0.932*** 0.912***
b 0.024 -0 .08*** -0 .08***
t 0.494*** -0 .02*** 0.39*** -0 .017*** 0.360*** -0 .016***
t2 -0 .28*** -0 .03*** -0 .022***
J 1.17[0 .76] 3 .70[0 .593] 3 .71[0 .29] 7 .60[0 .18] 4 .130 [0 .941] 7 .596 [0 .180]
Czech Republic
Smpl 1997:11 - 2010:1 N/A 1997:11 - 2010:1
' 0.22*** 0.132***
b 0.0060** -0 .11***
t -0 .0035*** 0.001*
t2 0.000011*** -0.00001***
J 2.09[0 .84] 11.31 [0 .185]
Georgia
Smpl 1996:2 - 2004:3 2004:4 - 2010:1 1996:2 - 2004:3 2004:4 - 2010:1 1999:2 - 2004:3 2004:3 - 2010:1
' 0.87*** 0.44*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.358*** 0.269**
b 0.48*** 0.139
t 0.032*** -0 .015*** 0.062*** -0 .011*** 0.040*** 0.077***
t2 -0 .002*** -0 .001***
J 7.42 [0 .11] 1 .63 [0 .80] 1 .28[0 .87] 6 .27 [0 .281] 9 .0723 [.336] 5 .998 [.647]
Kazakhstan
Smpl 1998:1 - 2001:7 2001:8-2010:1 1998:1 - 2001:7 2001:8-2010:1 1998:1 - 2001:7 2001:8-2010:1
' 0.15** 0.46*** 0.08*** 0.46*** 0.105*** 0.475***
b 0.12* 0.80*** 0.048**
t -0 .01 -0 .02*** 0.0005*** -0 .009*** -0 .004 -0 .015***
t2 0.0007*** 0.00009*** 0.001*** 0.000***
J 4.43[0 .49] 4 .12[0 .53] 0 .72[0 .98] 5 .95[0 .20] 4 .257 [.935] 8 .568 [.285]
Kyrgyz Republic
Smpl 1996:1 - 2004:1 2004:2 - 2010:1 1996:1 - 2004:1 2004:2 - 2010:1 1996:1 - 2004:1 2004:2 - 2010:1
' 0.30*** 0.760*** 0.415*** 0.759*** 0.443*** 0.738***
b 0.68*** -0 .609** -0 .460**
t 0.015*** -0 .022*** 0.027*** -0 .023*** 0.025*** -0 .023***
t2
J 4.79 [0 .442] 4 .818 [.438] 7 .435 [.190] 6 .104 [.296] 6 .653 [.758] 7 .597 [.369]
Ta jikistan
Smpl 2002:1 - 2004:9 2004:10 - 2010:1 2002:1 - 2004:9 2004:10 - 2010:1 2002:1 - 2004:9 2004:10 - 2010:1
' 0.49*** 0.91*** 0.50*** 0.79*** 0.480*** 0.642***
b 0.04 0.229***
t 0.02*** 0.12*** 0.01*** 0.10*** 0.011*** 0.066***
t2 -0 .008*** -0.006*** -0 .001***
J 5.71[0 .33] 5 .94[0 .43] 2 .58[0 .76] 2 .29[0 .51] 4 .678 [.699] 7 .714 [.358]
Turkey
Smpl 1990:3 - 2003:1 2003:1 - 2009:12 1990:3 - 2003:1 2003:1 - 2009:12 1990:3 - 2003:1 2003:1 - 2009:12
' 0.93** 0.86*** 0.810*** 0.819*** 0.91*** 0.849***
b 0.006***
t 0.10*** -0 .14*** 0.100*** -0 .095*** 0.040*** -0.124***
t2 0.0004*** 0.001*** -0 .0004*** 0.0007*** -0 .0001*** 0.001
J 1.46[0 .83] 1 .85[0 .87] 0 .73[0 .69] 4 .82[0 .58] 4 .11 [0 .66] 8 .694 [.275]
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Table 4. GMM Estim ation Resu lts: Case b
Model M 1b M2b M3b
Croatia
Smpl 1995:7 - 1997:06 1997:06 - 2009:12 1995:7 - 1997:06 1997:06 - 2009:12 1995:7 - 1997:06 1997:06 - 2009:12
' 0.916 0.934 0.942*** 0.972*** 0.983***
b 0.024 -0 .694***
t 0.332*** -0 .020*** 0.357** -0 .018*** 0.328*** NC
t2 -0 .022*** -0 .022*** -0 .021***
 -0 .102 0.098 0.075 0.509 0.527
J 2.260 [0 .520] 3 .817 [0 .431] 3 .785 [0 .151] 6 .097 [0 .192] 4 .172 [.900]
1
1 + 
- - - - -
Czech Republic
Smpl 1997:11 - 2010:1 N/A 1997:11 - 2010:1
' 0.175
b 0.006**
t -0 .003*** NC
t2 0.000***
 0.249





Smpl 1996:2 - 2004:3 2004:4 - 2010:1 1996:2 - 2004:3 2004:4 - 2010:1 1999:2 - 2004:3 2004:3 - 2010:1
' 0.998 0.506*** 0.180 0.555*** 0.256*
b 0.497*** 0.127
t 0.031*** -0 .012*** 0.066*** -0 .071**** 0.039*** NC
t2 0.000* 0.001***
 -0 .428 -0 .948*** -0 .985 -0 .754*** -0 .677**
J 7.450 [0 .114] 3 .051 [0 .802] 14.437 [0 .002] 5 .127[0 .275] 9 .928 [0 .270]
1
1 + 
- 19 .231 - 4 .065 3.096
Kazakhstan
Smpl 1998:1 - 2001:7 2001:8-2010:1 1998:1 - 2001:7 2001:8-2010:1 1998:1 - 2001:7 2001:8-2010:1
' 0.101 0.225 0.095 0.464*** 0.007 0.475***
b 0.116** 0.804** 0.043**
t -0 .013 -0 .024*** 0.000*** -0 .009*** -0 .003 -0 .015***
t2 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
 0.276 0.673 -0 .072 -0 .092 1.250 0.800***
J 5.810 [0 .214] 4 .57[0 .334] 0 .767 [0 .943] 5 .514 [0 .138] 4 .370 [0 .885] 4 .8 [0 .99]
1
1 + 
- - - - - 0 .556
Kyrgyz Republic
Smpl 1996:1 - 2004:1 2004:2 - 2010:1 1996:1 - 2004:1 2004:2 - 2010:1 1996:1 - 2004:1 2004:2 - 2010:1
' 0.242 0.862 0.478*** 0.604*** 0.428*** 0.896***
b 0.679*** -0 .690** -0 .474**
t 0.015*** -0 .022*** 0.028*** -0 .022*** 0.025*** -0 .019***
t2
 0.345 0.583 -0 .854*** -0 .615** 0.281 0.402**
J 4.853 [0 .303] 4 .657 [0 .324] 5 .663[0 .226] 5 .055 [0 .282] 6 .527 [0 .686] 7 .736 [0 .561]
1
1 + 
- - 6 .849 2.597 - 0 .713
Ta jikistan
Smpl 2002:1 - 2004:9 2004:10 - 2010:1 2002:1 - 2004:9 2004:10 - 2010:1 2002:1 - 2004:9 2004:10 - 2010:1
' 0.366 0.999*** 0.100 0.332 0.100
b 0.040 0.115
t 0.019*** 0.118 0.017** 0.103*** 0.012**
t2 -0 .001 -0 .001*** NC
 0.964 -4 .539 -0 .363 -0 .982 0.630
J 5.683 [0 .224] 15.523 [0 .017] 2 .555 [0 .635] 15.586 [0 .004] 5 .035 [0 .539]
1
1 + 
- - - - -
Turkey
Smpl 1990:3 - 2003:1 2003:1 - 2009:12 1990:3 - 2003:1 2003:1 - 2009:12 1990:3 - 2003:1 2003:1 - 2009:12
' 0.706 0.896 0.45*** 0.91*** 0.653***
b
t 0.102*** -0 .136*** 0.098*** -0 .116*** 0.037** NC
t2 0.000*** 0.001*** -0 .0003 0.0008*** 0.000
 -0 .045 0.167 -0 .979*** 0.45 -0 .554**
J 4.840 [0 .304] 1 .799 [0 .773] 6 .204 [0 .184] 4 .205 [0 .379] 4 .118 [0 .661]
1
1 + 
- - 47 .619 - 2 .242
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